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AGENCIES INTERPRETING COURTS INTERPRETING 
STATUTES: THE DEFERENCE CONUNDRUM OF A DIVIDED 
SUPREME COURT 
Robin Kundis Craig* 
ABSTRACT 
Plurality decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court demand interpretation, 
especially because they tend to occur when the Court faces important but 
divisive legal issues. Most courts, agencies, and scholars have assumed that 
federal agencies are in no better position to interpret plurality decisions than 
the lower federal courts when confronted with a potentially precedential 
Supreme Court plurality decision—the agency must construe the Justices’ 
various opinions in search of a controlling rationale. In so doing, however, the 
agency eschews any claim to Chevron deference because it is no longer 
implementing a statute pursuant to congressionally delegated authority. 
Instead, it is merely an agency interpreting a court. 
This Article argues that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 
federal agencies have another option when dealing with a Supreme Court 
plurality decision regarding either a statute that the agency implements or the 
agency’s prior interpretation of that statute. In the right circumstances, these 
post-plurality agencies can invoke their original congressionally delegated 
authority to implement the statute and issue new regulations that should be 
entitled to Chevron deference. Post-plurality agencies thus face a deference 
conundrum: they can defer to a fractured Supreme Court decision at the 
expense of their own claims to interpretive authority, or they can—admittedly 
with some risk in the next round of judicial review—reclaim interpretive 
deference for themselves. 
In assessing the deference conundrum, the exact character of the plurality 
decision is important. This Article includes a typology of Supreme Court 
plurality decisions involving agency-mediated statutes. When the 
 
 * Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. My 
thanks to Dave Markell, Jim Rossi, J.B. Ruhl, Mark Seidenfeld, and Uma Outka for their comments on the 
draft of this Article. Nevertheless, I remain solely responsible for its content. 
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Chevron/Brand X framework applies, however, agencies have the opportunity, 
and arguably the duty, to eliminate the confusion and inconsistency that 
plurality decisions promote by issuing clarifying and nationally uniform rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, when the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,1 it solidified a basic principle of federal 
administrative law: federal agencies are generally entitled to deference from 
the federal courts when those agencies interpret statutes that they implement, 
unless Congress has clearly already resolved the interpretive issue at hand.2 
While the Court has since modified the rules regarding the circumstances 
under which agencies are entitled to Chevron deference,3 creating what many 
commentators have denominated “a confusing muddle” of deference tests,4 it 
has never repudiated the core Chevron principle of interpretive deference. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, explicitly subordinated its 
own interpretive authority to that of agencies.5 More generally, in 2005 it 
announced in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services (Brand X) that the rationale of Chevron deference could allow an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute to supersede a prior and contradictory 
interpretation by a federal court.6 
Despite the Court’s privileging of agency interpretations, judicial review 
remains an important component of the deference framework,7 just as it is of 
 
 1 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2 Id. at 842–44. 
 3 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); Christensen v. 
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000) (declining to accord Chevron deference to opinion letters issued 
regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006))). 
 4 Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of 
Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 262 (2008); accord Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron 
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 
809–35 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 556, 606 (2009); Evan J. 
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1302, 1314–15 (2008); Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X 
Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second Step as Well as Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 151, 158, 161 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 
VA. L. REV. 597, 605–09 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193–94, 202 
(2006). 
 5 See discussion infra Part I.C.3. 
 6 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
 7 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary 
Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385, 397–402; Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some 
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442–43 (1989). 
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administrative law more generally.8 Judicial review of federal agencies’ 
statutory interpretations serves several purposes: it ensures that agencies do not 
act ultra vires or improperly expand the scope of their statutory authorities;9 it 
protects the public’s right of participation in agency decision making;10 it 
assesses the agency’s interpretations for basic rationality;11 it encourages the 
agency to take more care in resolving interpretive issues;12 and most 
importantly for this Article, it ensures that both the agency and regulated 
entities receive clear guidance regarding what the law requires and allows. 
In the context of federal agencies, such clarity promotes other values as 
well. For example, there is widespread acceptance, as a normative matter, that 
federal law should apply uniformly throughout the nation. Frank Easterbrook 
has noted that delegation to an agency “ensures that a single interpretation 
prevails” and “permits a nationally uniform rule without the need for the 
Supreme Court to settle the meaning of every law or regulation”13—even if the 
Court could undertake such a monumental task, which it cannot.14 Similarly, 
 
 8 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government 
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 499 
(2006); David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2169 (2010); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997). 
 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2006) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that are 
unconstitutional); id. § 706(2)(C) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that are “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern 
Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646, 666–68 (1988); 
Sargentich, supra note 8, at 605–06. 
 10 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring federal agencies to provide a public comment period during informal 
rulemaking); id. § 554(c) (requiring that interested parties be allowed to participate in federal agency 
hearings); id. § 706(2)(D) (allowing courts to overturn federal agency actions that do not follow proper 
procedures). 
 11 See id. § 706(2)(A) (creating the federal “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review); id. § 706(2)(E) 
(creating the “substantial evidence” standard of review for formal agency proceedings); Bressman, supra note 
8, at 474; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1134 (2010); Sargentich, supra note 8, at 605–06. 
 12 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing 
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128–30 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s 
Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 303 (2011). 
 13 Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004); 
accord William Wade Buzbee, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
582, 602 (1985) (noting that “administrative agencies have a national jurisdiction” and assuming that “uniform 
administration by the agency” is a worthy goal). 
 14 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100, 1117–26 (1987) 
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commentators or legislators seeking consistent resolutions to nationwide 
problems often seek to establish a regulatory program within a federal 
agency.15 At the individual level, the federal courts insist that federal agencies 
treat similarly situated regulated entities throughout the nation consistently in 
adjudications.16 Thus, judicial review promotes uniform implementation of 
regulatory law nationwide by giving clear guidance regarding the legitimacy of 
the agency’s implementation of that law. 
Legal clarity, certainty, and uniformity are recognized rule-of-law values,17 
particularly when the law seeks to regulate private conduct.18 Judicial review 
by the Supreme Court promotes these rule-of-law values both by resolving 
 
(noting that, given the Court’s limited docket, Chevron deference represents a concession that statutes are not 
precise). 
 15 See, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in 
Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 120 (2009) (“[L]abor law 
preemption doctrine sprang from the New Dealers’ faith in a federal administrative agency’s ability to 
enunciate and promulgate a uniform and consistent national labor relations policy.”); Joseph A. Peters, The 
Meaningful Vote Commission: Restraining Gerrymanders with a Federal Agency, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1051, 1068 (2010) (“A federal agency would provide a national, consistent system for limiting 
gerrymandering.”); Bradley T. Tennis, Note, Uniform Ethical Regulation of Federal Prosecutors, 120 YALE 
L.J. 144, 178 (2010) (“A uniform national system of regulation for federal prosecutors can be created only by a 
federal agency . . . .”). 
 16 See, e.g., P.I.A. Mich. City Inc. v. Thompson, 292 F.3d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Indep. Petrol. Ass’n 
of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 367, 
369 (4th Cir. 1994); Int’l Rehabilitative Scis., Inc. v. Sebelius, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288–90 (W.D. Wash. 
2010). 
 17 One group of scholars has summarized rule-of-law scholarship, concluding that “[t]he essential 
elements to a legal regime based on the rule of law involve: (1) clear and understandable rules; (2) 
predictability and certainty; (3) procedural validity in the formation of rules; and (4) rules independent of 
individual whims of government officials and instead with a basis in established law.” Berkolow, Much Ado 
About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation after 
Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 309 (2008); accord Levy & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 503 (“While 
the rule of law has various connotations and shades of meaning, at a minimum it reflects a core requirement of 
legal regularity under which government actors derive their authority from, and are bound by, the law.”) In 
administrative law, judicial review of agency decisions, including agency interpretations of statutes, can 
promote all four of the elements that Berkolow articulated, but this Article focuses on the first two. Other 
scholars have noted the significance of these elements, as well. See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, 
Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 529 (2011) (“Clear, understandable precedent is necessary to 
‘reduce[] transaction costs and wasted judicial effort, and encourage[] like cases to be treated alike—the 
bedrock of equality and fairness.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the 
Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 
207, 233 (2008) (footnotes omitted))); Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 758 (1980) (noting that our system values “certainty, reliance, equality, 
and efficiency”). 
 18 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Levy & Shapiro, supra note 8, at 504; Linas E. Ledebur, 
Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme Court, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 899, 
919 (2009). 
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legal conflicts among the lower courts and by providing definitive statements 
of what the law is and what the law requires.19 From this bird’s-eye, and 
admittedly pragmatic, view of judicial review, this Article begins from the 
premise that, although the details of the Chevron deference framework have 
become convoluted and unpredictable,20 a larger problem arises when judicial 
review fails to give federal agencies, lower courts, and the general public a 
clear decision regarding the validity of an agency’s implementation of a 
statute. In other words, whatever level of deference the courts decide to give an 
agency’s interpretation, what the agency and regulated entities want (or should 
want) most from the reviewing courts is clear guidance regarding what they 
can and cannot do under the statutory regime at issue.21 Thus, without ignoring 
the very real complexities and problems that arise in applying the Chevron 
framework, it is worth remembering that that framework is, most essentially, a 
tool for assessing what is permissible under federal law. 
Most discussions of the Supreme Court’s deference cases focus, naturally, 
on the federal courts’ initial review of an agency interpretation—on issues 
such as the kind of deference courts owe to various forms of agency 
interpretation22 and the type of review each level of deference actually 
 
 19 Berkolow, supra note 17, at 306 (“Precedent is a means of enforcing rule-of-law values such as 
continuity and predictability.”). 
 20 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 788–94; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 848–52 (2001); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, 
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1727, 1744, 1767 (2010). 
 21 See Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 457 
(2009) (criticizing the courts for not providing clear guidance); James Michael Magee, Note, The Public Policy 
Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitration Awards—How Far Should Expansion Go?, 39 S.C. L. 
REV. 465, 469 (1988) (noting criticism when the Court is too cryptic to provide guidance). 
Of course, there are important distinctions between what the law requires of private entities and what it 
requires of federal agencies, as well as corresponding distinctions between the federal courts’ interpretations of 
statutes in Chevron evaluations and in the direct regulatory context. Under Chevron, courts are primarily 
concerned with whether the agency is acting within a permissible sphere of interpretive authority. In contrast, 
when directly interpreting how statutes apply to regulated entities, courts, by necessity, must arrive at a 
particular meaning. See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–8, 12–14 (2000) (discussing rule-of-law values and agency decision 
making in the nondelegation context). For purposes of this Article, the distinctions between the requirements 
for private entities and federal agencies are inconsequential because the issues are whether and when a federal 
agency, through Chevron and Brand X, can supplant direct court interpretation. 
 22 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 4, at 556 (discussing difficulties in applying Mead); Nathan Alexander 
Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory 
Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (arguing that agencies’ determinations of the scope of their own 
jurisdiction should not receive Chevron deference); Thomas Moore, Note, Abandoning Mead: Why Informal 
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requires.23 In contrast, this Article focuses on the next round of agency action, 
after the reviewing courts initially address, but do not fully resolve, the validity 
of a prior agency interpretation. Specifically, it investigates the options that 
remain for a federal agency when the Supreme Court reviews that agency’s 
interpretation of a statute but reaches no majority decision regarding the 
interpretation’s legal viability. 
Plurality decisions24 remain a small—but not insignificant—percentage of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions.25 Nevertheless, as Ken Kimura has observed, 
“A plurality decision, by its very nature, represents the most unstable form of 
case law.”26 In addition, empirical research indicates that the Court tends to 
issue plurality decisions about the most divisive legal issues it faces—“when 
the Court reviews politically salient and constitutional issues, and when there 
was dissensus on the lower court.”27 Thus, the issues that tend to produce 
 
Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 719, 725–32 
(discussing inconsistent application of judicial deference to informal agency adjudications). 
 23 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009) 
(comparing judicial roles under each step of the Chevron framework); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. 
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085–91 (2008) (discussing the wide variety of deference regimes the 
Supreme Court has employed in reviewing agency actions post-Chevron); Kelly, supra note 4 (discussing 
conflicting approaches to Chevron deference). 
 24 For purposes of this Article, a “plurality decision” is a decision of the Supreme Court in which less 
than a majority of Justices agree on the rationale for a decision, even if a majority of Justices agree on the 
disposition of the case itself. See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519. For example, a 5–4 decision to 
remand would still be a plurality decision if three of the Justices constituting the majority offered one rationale 
for remanding and the other two offered a different rationale. See, e.g., id. A “plurality opinion,” in contrast, is 
a particular Justice’s rationale for a decision that is joined by fewer than a majority of the Justices. See 
Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 101–
53 (1956), for one example of a more detailed typology of Supreme Court plurality decisions. 
 25 See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519 (calculating that plurality decisions constituted 3.4% of the 
5,711 cases decided between 1953 and 2006—a significant increase over the period from 1801 to 1955); 
Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of 
the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 100 (2007) (“[P]lurality 
decisions . . . have become a conspicuous part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.”); see also infra Part II 
(discussing the frequency of, and the law surrounding, Supreme Court plurality opinions). 
 26 Ken Kimura, Note, The Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1593, 1594 (1992). 
 27 Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States 
Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 180 (2010); accord Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 527; James A. 
Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States 
v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (2008); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision 
Making, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1140 (1981); W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plurality Precedent: Why 
the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks over Van Orden v. Perry, 85 NEB. L. REV. 830, 831 (2007); Mark I. 
Levy, Plurality Opinions, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 2007, at 13. 
CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:56 PM 
8 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1 
unstable plurality decisions are, perversely, the legal issues most in need of 
clarification. 
Plurality decisions “represent extreme dissensus” and create precedential 
uncertainty because lower courts not only have to find the rationale for each 
opinion but also must decide which opinion’s rationale governs.28 Discerning 
this controlling rationale can be quite difficult.29 Indeed, at least one scholar 
has referred to the interpretive task after a Supreme Court plurality opinion as 
“reading . . . the ‘tea leaves.’”30 
In the statutory context, the probability of a plurality decision has been 
enhanced in the last few decades because the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 
have been deeply divided regarding the proper methodology for statutory 
interpretation. This deep division has often resulted in the Court issuing 
majority and dissenting opinions that display fundamental differences in 
interpretive approach,31 in the weight the Justices give to extrastatutory 
concerns such as federalism,32 and in the final interpretations the Justices 
offer.33 As a result, the Court does not always deliver clear majority opinions 
in its statutory interpretation cases. For example, 4–4 decisions when one 
Justice does not participate34 and, most problematically, decisions with 
multiple opinions and no clear majority35 can leave both the lower courts and 
 
 28 See Corley et al., supra note 27, at 180, 181–83. 
 29 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and 
Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 160 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in 
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), left “the individual states and lower courts to quarrel over the weight 
and precedential value to be accorded to the case’s seven separate opinions”). 
 30 Marvin Zalman, Reading the Tea Leaves of Chavez v. Martinez: The Future of Miranda, 40 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 299, 334 (2004). 
 31 See Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations 
and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 958, 971–88 
(2005). 
 32 Compare Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312–13 (2010) (Scalia, J.) (focusing on 
federalism concerns), and Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593–96 (2009) (Alito, J.) (same), with Alabama, 
130 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (virtually ignoring federalism concerns), and Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 
2628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). 
 33 See discussion infra Part III. 
 34 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484 (2008) (demonstrating that the Court was 
equally divided on the issue of respondeat superior liability when Justice Alito did not participate in the 
decision). 
 35 See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (producing a particularly complex 5–
3–4–2–3 split among the Supreme Court Justices when the Court decided whether the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) applied to foreign-flagged vessels temporarily in U.S. waters, specifically addressing 
whether there was a presumption that federal law applies to foreign vessels, what showing would be necessary 
to overcome that presumption, and to what extent the otherwise-controlling exemption from ADA 
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the implementing federal agency with the unenviable task of deciding what to 
do next. 
At one point, the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions were considered to 
have little precedential value, binding on lower courts, if at all, only for the 
exact holding and not for any legal rationale.36 However, the Supreme Court 
has—admittedly, inconsistently37—insisted that a plurality opinion can be 
identified as the ratio decidendi for a plurality decision and hence operate as 
binding precedent.38 As a result, federal courts have their own frameworks for 
discerning these binding rationales out of plurality decisions,39 most commonly 
the Marks rule,40 which is discussed more thoroughly in Part II. Importantly 
for this Article, because of the potential precedential status of plurality 
decisions, lower federal courts are not free to pursue independent courses of 
action in the wake of a Supreme Court plurality decision. Instead, they are 
essentially stuck with the task of trying to interpret the various Justices’ 
opinions to decide how to apply them—or an identified ratio decidendi—to 
new factual contexts.41 
In contrast to the typical practice of lower federal courts, this Article argues 
that after Brand X the post-plurality choices for federal agencies are not so 
 
requirements would apply); see also Marceau, supra note 29, at 160 (noting that the Supreme Court’s plurality 
decision in Baze left “the individual states and lower courts to quarrel over the weight and precedential value 
to be accorded to the case’s seven separate opinions”); Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 261 
(2000) (“Real problems arise when there is less than a clear majority speaking for the Court—when the leading 
opinion of the Court is a plurality opinion. A Supreme Court plurality decision holds ambiguous precedential 
value.”). 
 36 See Marceau, supra note 29, at 164–66; Comment, supra note 24, at 100; Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, 
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 
DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992); see also Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 95–98 (2002) (noting that “the general practice is to regard such a divided vote 
as no decision at all” and detailing that plurality decisions in early United States law and still in most common 
law jurisdictions “had no precedential value”). 
 37 See Bloom, supra note 27, at 1377 nn.20–22; Hochschild, supra note 35, at 282. 
 38 But see Marceau, supra note 29, at 161 (critiquing “the unchallenged assumption that plurality 
opinions . . . generate reliably binding precedent in the context of capital appeals”). 
 39 See Kimura, supra note 26, at 1600–04 (discussing a variety of approaches courts have taken); Novak, 
supra note 17, at 767–78 (same). 
 40 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (setting out the “narrowest grounds” analysis for 
discerning the controlling rationale of plurality decisions); see also Ledebur, supra note 18, at 910–14 
(discussing a variety of approaches to dealing with Supreme Court plurality decisions). 
 41 See Marceau, supra note 29, at 162 (noting that, given stare decisis, “a published decision that does not 
contain any single rationale for judgment that is supported by a majority of the Court presents a unique 
predicament for judges and lawyers alike”). 
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limited. Specifically, in the face of contradictory or irreconcilable plurality 
opinions from Supreme Court Justices regarding the viability of an agency’s 
prior interpretation of a statute, a federal agency faces a choice: it can try to 
interpret the Court, or it may begin anew in interpreting the statute. 
When choosing between these two responses, however, the agency faces 
what this Article refers to as the “deference conundrum.” By following the first 
post-plurality path, the agency effectively chooses to defer to the Supreme 
Court’s “decision” by trying to honor the Justices’ plurality opinions. In doing 
so, the agency gives up its own claim to interpretive deference. Agencies that 
pursue this first path behave essentially as the lower courts do, attempting to 
discern a controlling rationale from the various Justices’ opinions. 
Accordingly, the post-plurality agency moves itself one step away from the 
Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference framework42 because the agency is no 
longer an agency interpreting a statute that it implements. Instead, it is an 
agency interpreting a court interpreting a statute. As a result, the Supreme 
Court’s Chevron/Brand X rationales for deferring to the agency’s new 
implementation of the statute disappear because the agency is no longer acting 
pursuant to congressionally delegated lawmaking authority. Rather, the agency 
is taking over a quintessentially judicial function. 
Alternatively, and with some admitted risk for the next round of judicial 
review, the post-plurality agency could treat the plurality decision as either a 
nondecision regarding statutory meaning or as proof positive that the statute is 
ambiguous for purposes of Chevron Step One. Of course, pragmatically, the 
agency should not ignore the Court’s plurality decisions regarding the 
legitimacy of its own interpretation because, depending on how many opinions 
the Justices produced and how exactly those opinions align, it may be clear 
that the Court has effectively bounded the statutory ambiguity in some way. 
Nevertheless, by following this second post-plurality path, the agency treats 
the Justices’ opinions as data points regarding the statute’s meaning while 
retaining primary authority to interpret the statute. 
The legal question is whether an agency will receive Chevron deference if 
it follows this second path. This Article argues that it should. Specifically, 
under the logic of Chevron and Brand X, if the agency, in the absence of the 
plurality decision, would otherwise be entitled to Chevron deference for its 
second-round interpretation, it should remain entitled to full Chevron 
 
 42 See infra Part I.A–B, for a discussion of this framework. 
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deference despite the fact that its new interpretation comes in the wake of a 
Supreme Court plurality decision regarding the viability of the prior 
interpretation. In addition, the agency’s new interpretation will likely better 
promote the values of clarity, uniformity, equality, and fairness than the 
Supreme Court’s plurality decision. 
This Article explores the deference conundrum for post-plurality federal 
agencies—agencies coping with a Supreme Court plurality decision regarding 
the legitimacy of a prior agency interpretation of an agency-implemented 
statute. Part I outlines the Chevron/Mead/Skidmore framework and discusses 
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Brand X, which extended Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations that change federal court precedent. Part II 
provides an overview of Supreme Court plurality decisions, detailing their 
frequency, discussing their legal import, and analyzing lower courts’ responses 
to them. However, because not all Supreme Court plurality decisions create the 
deference conundrum for federal agencies, Part III provides a typology of 
plurality decisions involving agency-mediated statutes and analyzes the 
potential relevance of Chevron and Brand X for each category. Part IV presents 
a case study of the deference conundrum—the joint response of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (Army Corps) to the Supreme Court’s fractured interpretation of the 
federal Clean Water Act (CWA) in Rapanos v. United States.43 It then 
recommends an alternative regulatory approach, especially salient in light of 
Congress’s unwillingness to intervene and the split that has developed among 
the federal courts of appeals regarding how to analyze CWA jurisdiction. The 
Article concludes by arguing that if the Supreme Court punts the issue of 
determining, decisively, whether an agency interpretation of a statute is valid, 
particularly in a regulatory context, values of clarity and uniformity dictate that 
administrative agencies should exercise their authority under Chevron and 
Brand X to reinterpret the statutes that they administer. 
I. THE CONVOLUTIONS OF CHEVRON, MEAD, SKIDMORE, AND BRAND X 
A. Agency Interpretations of Statutes: Basic Chevron Deference 
It has been a truism from the earliest days of the Supreme Court that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
 
 43 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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law is.”44 However, given the rise of the administrative state in the federal 
government, the Supreme Court now often confronts issues of statutory 
construction with a mediating agency interpretation already in place. Such 
agency interpretations force federal courts to confront the possibility that 
Congress preferred that an entity within the Executive Branch construe the 
statutory scheme at issue.45 Since at least 1984, the Supreme Court has 
respected this congressional preference, most commonly through the doctrine 
of Chevron deference. 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,46 which 
involved the EPA’s rather technical interpretation of the federal Clean Air 
Act,47 the Supreme Court created a two-step process for reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of an agency-administered statute. When applying Chevron, 
federal courts first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”48 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”49 However, if Congress’s intent 
is not clear—if there is an ambiguity or gap in the statutory scheme—the 
federal court proceeds to the second step in the analysis, asking “whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”50 
The Chevron Court clearly recognized that it was subordinating the federal 
courts’ interpretive authority to that of administrative agencies. Thus, if the 
reviewing court “determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
 
 44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 45 Whether this congressional preference is objectively “true” for any given statute, or even most statutes, 
has been debated at length by scholars, see, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 712–17 (1997), and Supreme Court Justices, see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our 
Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267 (2002); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–17. Nevertheless, this congressional 
preference is the legal fiction upon which Chevron and, even more extensively, Mead rest, and it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to challenge that foundation. 
 46 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 47 Id. at 839–42 (describing the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q 
(2006))). 
 48 Id. at 842. 
 49 Id. at 842–43. 
 50 Id. at 843. 
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interpretation.”51 Instead, respect for Congress dictates respect for the agency 
to which Congress “entrusted” the statutory scheme.52 Moreover, the agency’s 
interpretation is entitled to such respect regardless of whether Congress’s 
delegation of authority was explicit or implicit.53 
The Court also indicated that deference to administrative agencies is 
particularly warranted when the agency’s interpretation involves legislative-
like policy choices in a highly complex and technical area of law—choices 
with respect to which the federal courts have no particular expertise or 
legitimacy.54 As a result, when litigants challenge “the wisdom of [an] 
agency’s policy,” rather than its reasonableness under the relevant statute, the 
challenge must fail: “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”55 
B. Limiting Chevron Deference: Christensen, Mead, and Skidmore 
Chevron deference clearly remains available to federal agencies 
interpreting statutes that they administer. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the Supreme Court progressively limited the 
circumstances under which federal agencies’ interpretations would receive full 
Chevron deference. 
In its 2000 decision in Christensen v. Harris County56 and its 2001 decision 
in United States v. Mead Corp.,57 the Supreme Court determined that both the 
quality of the agency’s decision-making process and the character of its 
delegated authority were relevant to the amount of deference, if any, the 
agency’s statutory interpretation would receive. In Christensen, the Court held 
that an agency opinion letter issued under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
193858 (FLSA) was not entitled to Chevron deference because it did not carry 
the force of law.59 In particular, the Court emphasized that the agency had not 
 
 51 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 52 Id. at 844. 
 53 Id. at 843–44. 
 54 Id. at 865–66. 
 55 Id. at 866. 
 56 529 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2000). 
 57 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001). 
 58 Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)). 
 59 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
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arrived at its interpretation through deliberative proceedings, such as formal 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.60 
Although the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference, 
the Court held it was still entitled to some deference pursuant to Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co.61 Under Skidmore, agency interpretations of statutes are entitled to 
deference, “but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to 
persuade.’”62 More specifically, “The weight [accorded to an agency 
interpretation] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident 
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”63 
Christensen thus suggested that the type of procedures that the agency used 
in issuing its interpretation would determine the level of deference that the 
interpretation received. Mead expanded the deference inquiry into the nature of 
the agency’s statutory authority.64 According to the Mead Court, 
“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies 
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”65 The Court recognized that “agencies charged with applying a 
statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices,” and hence, “[t]he fair 
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been 
understood to vary with circumstances.”66 The factors relevant to the level of 
deference accorded include “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s 
position.”67 
The Mead Court also noted that when an agency has authority to act with 
the force of law and uses that authority to resolve a statutory ambiguity or to 
fill a statutory gap, Chevron deference applies with full force. As it had in 
Chevron, the Court emphasized: 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 62 Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
 63 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 64 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 
 65 Id. at 226–27. 
 66 Id. at 227–28. 
 67 Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted). 
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[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of 
its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory 
ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems 
unwise, but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has 
not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.68 
Moreover, an agency’s failure to announce its interpretation through formal 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking does not necessarily obviate 
Chevron deference.69 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the Custom Service’s tariff rulings at 
issue did not warrant Chevron deference.70 As a statutory matter, the Court 
concluded that “the terms of the congressional delegation give no indication 
that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification 
rulings with the force of law.”71 The Customs Service itself did not view the 
tariff rulings as having the general force of law because they were binding only 
between itself and the relevant importer.72 Moreover, “46 different Customs 
offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each year.”73 
Mead thus complicated Christensen’s relatively simple focus on the 
procedures an agency uses. In his lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia anticipated 
“protracted confusion,”74 arguing that “[w]e will be sorting out the 
consequences of the Mead doctrine . . . for years to come.”75 Much scholarship 
supports his prediction.76 
 
 68 Id. at 229 (citation omitted) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–46 (1984)). 
 69 Id. at 230–31. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 231–32. 
 72 Id. at 233. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. at 239. 
 76 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1577–78 (2006); Amy J. Wildermuth, What Twombly and Mead 
Have in Common, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 276, 277–78 (2008); Estella F. Chen, Note, Judicial 
Deference After United States v. Mead: How Streamlining Measures at the Board of Immigration Appeals 
May Transform Traditional Notions of Deference in Immigration Law, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 657, 677–78 
(2006). See generally Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice 
Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (2006) (providing a summary of scholars’ arguments regarding the 
continued confusion resulting from Mead). 
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C. Agencies, Federal Court Precedent, and the Meaning of Statutes: The 
Brand X Complication 
1. The Brand X Decision 
Christensen and Mead clearly limit the availability of Chevron deference, 
even if the exact boundaries between Chevron and Skidmore deference remain 
hazy. In contrast, in its 2005 decision in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services77 (Brand X), the 
Supreme Court expanded the availability of Chevron deference and the 
authority of federal agencies to control the meaning of the statutes that they 
implement. In Brand X, the Court reviewed the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) declaratory ruling that cable companies providing 
broadband Internet access are exempt from regulation under Title II of the 
Telecommunications Act,78 which subjects all providers of 
“telecommunications servic[e]” to mandatory common-carrier regulation.79 In 
March 2000, the FCC concluded that broadband Internet service provided by 
cable companies is an “information service,” but not a telecommunications 
service, “[b]ecause Internet access provides a capability for manipulating and 
storing information” and because of “[t]he integrated nature of Internet access 
and the high-speed wire used to provide Internet access.”80 
Ultimately, on the merits, the Court upheld the FCC’s decision under both 
Chevron81 and an arbitrary-and-capricious analysis.82 However, before 
reaching the merits, eight Justices agreed that federal agencies can “overrule” 
federal court constructions of statutes that the agencies administer.83 
Specifically, the Court concluded that “[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that 
the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore 
contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency 
construction.”84 Moreover, the agency’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference if it otherwise qualifies for such deference.85 
 
 77 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 78 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 79 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 974 (alteration in original). 
 80 Id. at 977–79. 
 81 Id. at 980–82. 
 82 See id. at 1000–02 (finding that the FCC provided adequate rational justification for its conclusions). 
 83 Id. at 982–83. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 982. 
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In Brand X itself, numerous parties petitioned for judicial review of the 
FCC’s declaratory ruling, and a judicial lottery sent the case to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Rather than use the Chevron analysis to 
review the FCC’s construction of the Telecommunications Act, the Ninth 
Circuit invalidated the ruling based on its own precedent in AT&T Corp. v. 
City of Portland.86 
The Supreme Court, however, held that the Ninth Circuit should have used 
the Chevron analysis, not its own precedent, to evaluate the FCC’s 
construction of the Telecommunications Act. First, the Court reasoned, the 
Chevron analysis applied because Congress had delegated to the FCC authority 
to execute and enforce the Telecommunications Act and “the Commission 
issued the order under review in the exercise of that authority.”87 
Second, with regard to the role of federal courts’ constructions in the first 
step of the Chevron analysis, the Court stated, “A court’s prior judicial 
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to 
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.”88 The Brand X Court reasoned that “allowing a judicial 
precedent to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute, as the 
Court of Appeals assumed it could, would allow a court’s interpretation to 
override an agency’s. Chevron’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to 
fill statutory gaps.”89 The Court also distinguished its own precedent in Neal v. 
United States,90 in which the existence of a prior Court construction resulted in 
the Court granting no deference to the agency’s different interpretation, on the 
grounds that the judicial precedent at issue in Neal “had held the relevant 
statute to be unambiguous.”91 
Third, the Supreme Court indicated that federal court precedent renders a 
statute unambiguous only if the court’s decision clearly indicates that its 
reading is “the only permissible reading of the statute.”92 The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in City of Portland did not achieve this level of exclusiveness because 
 
 86 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1128–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Corp. v. City 
of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875–79 (9th Cir. 2000)), rev’d, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 87 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–81. 
 88 Id. at 982. 
 89 Id. 
 90 516 U.S. 284 (1996). 
 91 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). 
 92 Id. 
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the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly hold that the Telecommunications Act was 
unambiguous regarding whether cable Internet providers were 
“telecommunications carriers.”93 
The Brand X Court’s rationale was thus much the same as the Chevron 
Court’s: Congress delegates to federal agencies the authority to implement and 
interpret the statutes at issue, and hence, out of respect for Congress, the 
agencies’ interpretations are to be preferred to those of the courts.94 
Nevertheless, Brand X goes one step further than Chevron, requiring federal 
courts not only to respect existing agency interpretations but also to actively 
subordinate their own prior interpretations of federal statutes to the later 
decisions of federal agencies. While the Supreme Court is still wrestling with 
the implications of this view of the federal courts’ role, especially in 
connection with its own prior decisions, the lower courts have been steadily 
applying Brand X to conflicts between agency and court interpretations.95 
2. Brand X in the Lower Federal Courts 
While the cases to which the Brand X rule applies have been fairly limited, 
the lower federal courts have generally applied the rule to achieve the results 
that the Supreme Court dictated: agency interpretations of statutes receive 
Chevron deference despite existing court precedent to the contrary, and in fact, 
such agency interpretations can supersede that precedent. In one of the earliest 
cases applying Brand X, for example, the First Circuit set aside its own prior 
decision, which had concluded that applications for thermal variances under 
the CWA require a formal adjudication in accordance with the Federal 
 
 93 Id. at 984–85. 
 94 Id. at 982. 
 95 See Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude that under 
the principles outlined in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, a 
subsequent, reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute, which avoids raising serious 
constitutional doubts, is due deference notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier contrary interpretation of 
the statute.” (citation omitted)); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 502–03 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 
Brand X for the proposition that if a court interprets an ambiguous statute one way, and an agency 
subsequently interprets the same statute another way, even the same court cannot ignore the agency’s 
interpretation); Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Brand X but noting that 
the decision did nothing to alter the effect of a finding that Congress spoke clearly to the issue under Chevron 
Step One); Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the proviso 
that a court must accord Chevron deference to an agency’s subsequent interpretation only if the “court’s earlier 
precedent was an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity”); Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 
443 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court’s intent in Brand X was to eliminate the 
possibility that Chevron applicability would turn on the order in which judicial and agency interpretations 
issue). 
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Administrative Procedure Act96 (APA), in favor of the EPA’s new 
interpretation that the statutory “public hearing” could be something less than a 
full-blown evidentiary hearing.97 The First Circuit emphasized that its prior 
decision came before not only the EPA’s interpretation but also before 
Chevron itself and that its precedent merely established a presumption in favor 
of formal adjudication, not a definitive reading of the CWA provisions at 
issue.98 Several other courts have similarly applied the Brand X rule.99 In 
addition, the Third Circuit extended the Brand X rule to agency interpretations 
of regulations that contradict the court’s prior interpretations.100 
When lower federal courts resist the elimination of their own precedent 
pursuant to Brand X, they do so for one of two reasons. First, lower courts may 
consider judicial precedent to be so definitive or long established that it 
embodies the only allowable interpretation of the statute at issue, effectively 
rendering the statute unambiguous. For example, in 2006, the U.S. Tax Court 
went out of its way to distinguish Brand X and refused to accord Chevron 
deference to an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulation that contradicted 
long-standing court precedent.101 The Tax Court differentiated Brand X on 
several grounds. Unlike the FCC’s careful consideration of the statute and its 
policies during the promulgation of its regulation in Brand X, the IRS’s 
“rationale for adopting the disputed regulations [wa]s at best perfunctory.”102 
In addition, the FCC’s regulations in Brand X were new, while the IRS was 
changing regulations that had been in place since 1957, raising additional 
 
 96 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 97 Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 14–17 (1st Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. 
Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877–78 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
 98 Id. at 16–17; accord 33 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), 1342(a) (2006) (requiring a “public hearing” under the 
CWA). 
 99 See, e.g., Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1078, 1086–88 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that its interpretation of the discretionary waiver of inadmissibility in immigration had been 
superseded by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) interpretation); Fernandez, 502 F.3d at 347–48 
(concluding that the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s phrase “national of the 
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2006), superseded the court’s own interpretation of that phrase in 
United States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
 100 See Levy, 544 F.3d at 502–03 (extending Brand X’s logic and giving deference to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s interpretation of its own regulation, even though the agency’s interpretation 
contradicted Third Circuit precedent). This extension is logical because agencies typically receive even greater 
deference than Chevron deference from the courts regarding their interpretations of their own regulations. See 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (establishing this rule of greater deference). 
 101 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 143–47 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 102 Id. at 144. 
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issues regarding their reasonableness.103 Moreover, whereas the FCC had not 
been a party in the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision, the IRS had been a party in 
all other cases that had interpreted the statutory provision at issue.104 The Ninth 
Circuit precedent in Brand X was only five years old, whereas the IRS was 
trying to change a court interpretation that had been in place since 1938.105 
Finally, although the prior court decisions regarding that interpretation of the 
tax code were not explicit that their interpretation was the only permissible 
one, the Tax Court nevertheless concluded that the required exclusivity was 
apparent in the opinions.106 
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s decision, 
concluding that the IRS regulation was both entitled to Chevron deference107 
and valid.108 The Third Circuit applied Brand X at Chevron Step One and 
disagreed with the Tax Court that prior courts had effectively determined that 
their interpretation was the only one possible.109 “Accordingly,” it concluded, 
“we are not bound by previous judicial interpretations.”110 Similar Brand X 
debates about the effect of precedent on statutory ambiguity have occurred in 
other courts as well, with similar results.111 
Second, and more relevant to this Article, lower courts will refuse to allow 
the Brand X rule to overturn their own precedent when that existing precedent 
has already considered the agency regulation or interpretation at issue. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) to use Brand X to resurrect an interpretation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) that the Ninth Circuit had previously determined was 
unreasonable under Chevron.112 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that in Brand X, 
its prior decision “had not even considered an agency interpretation of the 
Communications Act, nor had we applied Chevron deference when we 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 144–45. 
 105 Id. at 145. 
 106 Id. at 146–47. 
 107 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 167–68 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 108 Id. at 168–72. 
 109 Id. at 170. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Compare, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1173–74 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that Brand X did not apply because the court’s precedent declared the 
tax code provision at issue unambiguous), rev’d en banc, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 704 
(2011), with Mayo, 568 F.3d at 679–83 (reversing the district court, declaring the statute ambiguous, and 
applying Chevron deference to the tax regulation). 
 112 Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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interpreted the statute.”113 In contrast, with respect to the BIA’s proffered 
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit had previously fully considered that 
interpretation through a Chevron analysis and rejected it as unreasonable.114 
Brand X, according to the court, did not provide “that an agency may resurrect 
a statutory interpretation that a circuit court has foreclosed by rejecting it as 
unreasonable at Chevron’s second step.”115 Instead, the Ninth Circuit precedent 
remained viable, the agency’s recycled interpretation remained unreasonable, 
and the agency approach at issue was deemed invalid.116 Similarly, in a series 
of cases applying the FLSA, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims concluded that 
the Brand X rule does not apply when the agency interpretation predated the 
court precedent at issue and the prior court fully considered that interpretation 
in its application of the statute.117 
Lower court applications of Brand X thus point out an important 
dichotomy. Brand X applies when the federal courts had the first chance to 
interpret an ambiguous statute that an agency implements, and it is unlikely 
that lower court judicial precedent—no matter how long established—will be 
deemed to have eliminated any inherent statutory ambiguity. However, if the 
judicial precedent at issue fully addressed the agency’s proffered 
interpretation, an agency cannot use Brand X to circumvent the court’s prior 
resolution. Instead, principles of stare decisis prevail. As Part III will discuss, 
the Supreme Court plurality decisions of interest to this Article complicate this 
rather neat dichotomy because they both engage an existing agency 
interpretation and fail to invalidate decisively the agency’s view. 
3. The Remaining Issue: Will the U.S. Supreme Court Apply Brand X to 
Itself? 
While the lower federal courts are developing a coherent Brand X 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has so far failed to extend that coherence to 
its own decisions. Indeed, in Brand X itself, Justice Stevens concurred 
specifically to emphasize that the Court’s decisions may warrant different 
treatment: 
 
 113 Id. at 1114. 
 114 Id. at 1112–13 (citing Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 115 Id. at 1114. 
 116 Id. at 1115; accord Escobar v. Holder, 567 F.3d 466, 478–80 (9th Cir. 2009) (reaching the same 
conclusion in essentially identical language), vacated, 572 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 117 Garner v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 756, 765–66 (2009); Stocum v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 217, 
225–26 (2008); Hamilton v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 206, 214–15 (2008). 
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While I join the Court’s opinion in full, I add this caveat 
concerning Part III-B, which correctly explains why a court of 
appeals’ interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a regulatory 
statute does not foreclose a contrary reading by the agency. That 
explanation would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by this 
Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.118 
In 2009, the Supreme Court split 5–4 in deciding Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Ass’n regarding the role that Brand X should play when the Court’s own 
precedent otherwise resolves the interpretive debate at issue.119 In Cuomo, the 
attorney general for the State of New York sent letters to several national 
banks, “in lieu of subpoena,” asking for certain nonpublic information to 
ascertain whether the banks were complying with the state’s fair-lending 
laws.120 The Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the 
Clearing House Association brought suit to enjoin the request, claiming that 
the OCC’s National Bank Act (NBA) regulations preempted state law 
enforcement against national banks.121 The NBA states, 
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers 
except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of 
justice or such as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by 
Congress or by either House thereof or by any committee of 
Congress or of either House duly authorized.122 
The OCC’s regulation implementing this provision, adopted through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, defines visitorial powers to include, inter alia, 
“[i]nspection of a bank’s books and records” and “[e]nforcing compliance with 
any applicable federal or state laws concerning” activities authorized or 
permitted pursuant to federal banking law.123 
The question for the Supreme Court was whether the OCC regulation 
preempted enforcement of nonbanking state laws against national banks. The 
majority stated both that the Chevron doctrine provided the framework for 
evaluating the OCC’s regulation and that “[t]here is necessarily some 
ambiguity as to the meaning of the statutory term ‘visitorial powers,’ 
 
 118 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (emphases added). 
 119 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). 
 120 Id. at 2714 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121 Id. 
 122 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 123 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2)(ii), (iv) (2011). 
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especially since we are working in an era when the prerogative writs—through 
which visitorial powers were traditionally enforced—are not in vogue.”124 
Thus, the case seemed ripe for deference to the OCC’s interpretation that state 
enforcement was preempted. 
Nevertheless, the majority was unwilling to defer to the OCC, emphasizing 
that under Supreme Court precedent, visitorial powers referred to the state-as-
sovereign’s supervisory role over corporations and charitable institutions.125 As 
a result, the Court concluded that “[t]he Comptroller’s regulation . . . does not 
comport with the statute.”126 Thus, according to the majority, Court precedent 
trumped a potential application of the Brand X rule, and the Court’s prior 
interpretation of a statute settled the issue of statutory meaning, regardless of 
the potential statutory ambiguities that otherwise would have existed. 
However, the dissenters—Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy and Alito—would have applied Brand X. They agreed 
with the majority that the term visitorial powers was ambiguous.127 However, 
they would have upheld the OCC’s regulatory interpretation as reasonable.128 
Importantly, the dissenters specifically disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that the OCC’s interpretation “is unreasonable because it conflicts 
with several of this Court’s decisions.”129 They instead noted that under Brand 
X, the New York attorney general 
cannot prevail by simply showing that this Court previously adopted 
a construction of § 484 that differs from the interpretation later 
chosen by the agency. “A court’s prior judicial construction of a 
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron 
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no 
room for agency discretion.”130 
According to the dissenters, therefore, even Supreme Court precedent “is 
insufficient to deny Chevron deference to OCC’s construction of § 484(a).”131 
 
 124 Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715. 
 125 See id. at 2716–17 (noting that the Court’s precedents confirm “that a sovereign’s ‘visitorial powers’ 
and its power to enforce the law are two different things”). 
 126 Id. at 2719. 
 127 Id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 128 Id. at 2722–27. 
 129 Id. at 2728. 
 130 Id. at 2728–29 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005)). 
 131 Id. at 2730. 
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The Supreme Court still has not used Brand X to displace its own 
precedent. Nevertheless, the dissenters in Cuomo suggest that the Justices may 
someday soon directly grapple with the Brand X rule’s implications for the 
Court’s own interpretations of agency-implemented federal statutes. Moreover, 
as will be discussed in Part III, even if the Supreme Court does eventually 
exempt its majority decisions from the Brand X rule, good arguments remain 
that Brand X should apply to Supreme Court plurality decisions regarding the 
meaning of statutes that federal agencies implement. First, however, this 
Article will examine Supreme Court plurality decisions more generally. 
II. SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS 
As many scholars have noted, the Supreme Court’s practice of issuing 
plurality decisions is generally criticized.132 According to these arguments, 
with which this Article largely agrees, Supreme Court plurality decisions upset 
the normal operation of binding precedent in lower courts.133 More 
specifically, such decisions fail to provide clear and majoritarian reasoning for 
the legal result,134 increase the work for lower courts,135 potentially perpetuate 
or create splits of authority,136 and, in general, represent an abdication of the 
Supreme Court’s responsibilities as the ultimate legal decision maker.137 
 
 132 E.g., Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373; Note, supra note 27, at 1127; Weins, supra note 27, at 831. But 
see Berkolow, supra note 17, at 348–49 (arguing that the indeterminacy created by plurality decisions can 
allow for valuable re-percolation of legal rules because “pluralities might indicate that the full Court was not 
yet ready or capable to fully resolve an interpretation, thereby signaling to the lower courts and other branches 
that they should make attempts to clarify the state of law”); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1417 (“Plurality 
decisions . . . initiate a type of normative dialogue between the Supreme Court and the lower courts, one which 
can contribute to the development of the law and help the law meet the demands of a changing society . . . .”); 
Novak, supra note 17, at 759–60 (arguing that plurality decisions allow for judicial freedom and flexibility). 
 133 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 320; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 905; Note, supra note 27, at 1127. 
 134 Ledebur, supra note 18, at 903. 
 135 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378. 
 136 See Levmore, supra note 36, at 100; Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 530–31 (“[T]he ambiguity and 
confusion created by plurality decisions can lead lower courts to ‘experiment with alternative rules and 
outcomes based on their own criteria,’ which can lead to an altered evolution of the law.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality 
Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 34 (2009))); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1378 (“[P]luralities obstruct the 
predictive function of law . . . .”). 
 137 Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378; Kimura, supra note 26, at 1625; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 919; 
Note, supra note 27, at 1128; see also Thurmon, supra note 36, at 419 (“[P]lurality decisions often do ‘more to 
confuse the current state of the law than to clarify it.’” (quoting John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, 
Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62)). 
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At the outset, it is worth noting that the difficulties that Supreme Court 
plurality opinions cause derive directly from the American legal system’s 
expectation of binding majority decisions.138 This expectation is itself a 
Supreme Court invention.139 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Chief 
Justice John Marshall purposely changed the Justices’ prior practice—
consistent with the practice in England—of announcing individual seriatim 
opinions.140 Seriatim opinions, of course, left lower courts with all of the same 
problems of discerning a governing legal rationale for the ultimate resolution 
that plurality decisions do now.141 To resolve this problem, but more 
importantly to increase the Supreme Court’s authority and legitimacy in the 
early Republic, Chief Justice Marshall initiated the now well-established 
practice of the Supreme Court issuing unified majority—and preferably 
unanimous—opinions.142 
Whatever its origin or quirkiness, the expectation of binding majority 
opinions has become the American norm. As a result, both the Supreme Court 
itself and legal scholarship have devoted much attention to how lower courts 
should deal with143 the increasing number144 of Supreme Court plurality 
 
 138 See Kimura, supra note 26, at 1596–98 (discussing the principle of majoritarianism in Supreme Court 
decision making); Novak, supra note 17, at 757–61 (discussing the value of majority opinions and rationales). 
 139 Marceau, supra note 29, at 164–66. 
 140 Hochschild, supra note 35, at 283–85; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 902. 
 141 See Ledebur, supra note 18, at 902; see also Marceau, supra note 29, at 162 (arguing that, given stare 
decisis, “a published decision that does not contain any single rationale for judgment that is supported by a 
majority of the Court presents a unique predicament for judges and lawyers alike”). 
 142 Marceau, supra note 29, at 166; Hochschild, supra note 35, at 267–68; Thurmon, supra note 36, at 
427. 
 143 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 27, at 1374 (arguing that the courts need a consistent method for 
interpreting plurality decisions). Not everyone accepts, however, that nonmajority opinions should establish 
binding precedent. Linas Ledebur, for example, has argued that “[i]t seems logical that if cases are to be 
decided by a group of Justices, a majority of them must be required for the ruling to be binding.” Ledebur, 
supra note 18, at 902–03. 
 144 Various scholars have counted Supreme Court plurality decisions in different ways, but all agree that 
the numbers of such decisions increased in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A 1981 note in 
the Harvard Law Review reported that between 1801 and 1955, the Supreme Court issued 45 plurality 
decisions; from 1955 through the end of the Warren Court, 42 plurality decisions; and by 1981 in the Burger 
Court, 88 plurality decisions. Note, supra note 27, at 1127 n.1. A January 2011 study concurs, finding only 45 
Supreme Court plurality decisions between 1801 and 1955 (145 Terms) but 195 plurality decisions from 1953 
to 2006 (54 Terms). Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519; accord Berkolow, supra note 17, at 302 
(“[P]lurality opinions have proliferated in the Supreme Court.”); Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 60–61 
(presenting counts of plurality opinions to conclude that there has been a “distinct increase in the Court’s resort 
to the plurality opinion”); Marceau, supra note 29, at 168 (noting the increasing numbers of Supreme Court 
plurality decisions); Cacace, supra note 25, at 97–98 (noting that “[t]he Court has handed down a steadily 
increasing number of plurality decisions throughout its history” and discussing a variety of explanations for the 
phenomenon); Hochschild, supra note 35, at 272 (“Fractured opinions have increased dramatically since Chief 
CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:56 PM 
26 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1 
decisions in the last few decades. In 1977, for example, the Court established 
the Marks “narrowest grounds” rule,145 which one scholar has described as “a 
conscious attempt to end the confusion surrounding plurality decisions’ 
precedential value.”146 
On the merits, Marks involved due process challenges to the defendants’ 
criminal convictions for transporting obscene materials in violation of federal 
statutes.147 One potentially precedential Supreme Court decision was Memoirs 
v. Massachusetts, a plurality decision where the Justices split 3–2–4.148 At its 
core, the issue in Marks was which standard of obscenity the government had 
to meet in order to convict the defendants: (1) the standard from Miller v. 
California (applied retroactively), which worked against the defendants;149 (2) 
the Supreme Court’s last majority enunciation of an obscenity test in Roth v. 
United States, which the court of appeals viewed as very similar to the Miller 
standard;150 or (3) the Memoirs plurality standard, which favored the 
defendants.151 
The court of appeals determined that the Memoirs standard could not 
govern because there was no binding majority rationale. As the Supreme Court 
summarized, the court of appeals 
noted—correctly—that the Memoirs standards never commanded the 
assent of more than three Justices at any one time, and it apparently 
concluded from this fact that Memoirs never became the law. By this 
line of reasoning, one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal 
liability by looking not to Memoirs but to Roth v. United States, the 
last comparable plenary decision of this Court prior to Miller in 
which a majority united in a single opinion announcing the rationale 
behind the Court’s holding.152 
 
Justice Marshall’s tenure.”); Ledebur, supra note 18, at 900 (“The second half of the twentieth century has 
seen a significant rise in dissension in the Court. That dissension has continued to exist, even in the current 
Court whose Chief Justice has made it a mission to promote unanimity.” (footnote omitted)); Levy, supra note 
27, at 13 (“[R]ecently, . . . plurality decisions have proliferated.”). 
 145 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 146 Hochschild, supra note 35, at 279; accord Comment, supra note 24, at 154–55 (detailing the variety of 
ways in which lower courts treated Supreme Court plurality decisions before Marks); Thurmon, supra note 36, 
at 420 (describing the Marks rule as a means of assessing the precedential value of a plurality decision). 
 147 Marks, 430 U.S. at 189. 
 148 Id. at 190 (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)). 
 149 Id. at 189–90 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
 150 Id. at 192–93 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
 151 Id. at 190–91. 
 152 Id. at 192–93 (citation omitted). 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded, the court of appeals had gotten 
the analysis wrong. Instead of dismissing the plurality decision in Memoirs, the 
Court reasoned, the lower court should have applied what has now become 
known as the Marks rule: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”153 As applied 
to Memoirs, the Marks rule meant that the plurality opinion did operate as 
controlling precedent because the two concurring Justices who provided the 
fourth and fifth votes for the actual resolution offered broader grounds for 
obscenity convictions than the plurality did.154 
The Marks narrowest grounds rule sounds simple, and it can work quite 
well when the Supreme Court Justices actually offer “nested”—or 
progressively expanding—rationales in their plurality opinions (the “Russian 
dolls” model of plurality decisions).155 As has been widely observed, however, 
the Marks rule offers little guidance when Supreme Court Justices offer 
unrelated rationales for a decision.156 As a result, a number of commentators 
have both recognized that the lower courts vary widely in their applications of 
Marks to the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions157 and offered alternative 
strategies of their own.158 
 
 153 Id. at 193 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 154 Id. at 193–94. 
 155 E.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial 
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1993); accord Berkolow, supra note 17, at 326–33 (“Where the Marks rule 
does easily apply, in those opinions written along a continuum of broad to narrow reasoning, it is an 
enormously useful doctrine that provides guidance for lower courts deciphering fractured decisions.”). 
 156 Berkolow, supra note 17, at 333; Marceau, supra note 29, at 169; Thurmon, supra note 36, at 442. 
 157 See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 29, at 170–74 (explaining the “common denominator” and “predictive” 
approaches to applying the Marks rule); Cacace, supra note 25, at 122–25 (recognizing three approaches to 
applying Marks—the narrowest grounds approach, the “conventional view,” and the “social choice view”); 
Thurmon, supra note 36, at 429–42 (describing in detail two models for applying the Marks rule—the 
“implicit consensus” and predictive model); Weins, supra note 27, at 835–38 (detailing the implicit-consensus 
and predictive approaches to applying the Marks rule). 
 158 See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 81–85 (urging stronger leadership within the Court to 
avoid plurality decisions); Bloom, supra note 27, at 1412–16 (recommending the “simple reconciliation” and 
“policy space” methods); Kimura, supra note 26, at 1604–11 (offering a “legitimacy model” for interpreting 
Supreme Court plurality decisions based on fidelity to existing precedent); Ledebur, supra note 18, at 914 
(proposing to disallow concurring opinions); Thurmon, supra note 36, at 451–56 (offering an alternative 
approach to plurality decisions that emphasizes the role of imperative and persuasive authority in the Justices’ 
reasoning). 
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With very limited exceptions, however, the jurisprudence and scholarship 
of plurality decisions have focused on the interpretive dilemma facing the 
lower courts. Lower courts, of course, are bound to follow precedent 
established in higher courts, even when discerning what the precedent is may 
be difficult.159 However, as Chevron itself makes clear, federal agencies 
occupy a preferred position with respect to their authority to interpret statutes. 
Structurally, unlike lower federal courts, agencies are creations of the 
Legislative Branch and operate, for the most part, out of the Executive 
Branch.160 Under Chevron and Brand X, a federal agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that it implements, at least when issued through fairly formalized 
procedures pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority, is entitled to deference 
and can supersede the courts’ prior interpretations. The issue that the next Part 
addresses is how the Chevron/Brand X framework should apply in the context 
of the Supreme Court’s plurality decisions that interpret statutes that agencies 
implement. 
III.  A TYPOLOGY OF SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS AND BRAND X’S 
APPLICABILITY TO THE AGENCY’S FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE 
Not all Supreme Court plurality decisions involve an agency-mediated 
statutory scheme. For example, many questions of constitutional requirements 
in criminal procedure or questions involving the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Federal Rules of Evidence involve no agencies whatsoever. 
Plurality decisions on these subjects, therefore, do not raise any 
Chevron/Brand X issue. 
While all Supreme Court plurality decisions implicating an agency-
mediated statute potentially affect how the agency implements that statute, not 
all such decisions create the deference conundrum. Depending on what kind of 
issue, precisely, the Supreme Court is addressing, the agency may not have the 
option of invoking Brand X in its response. In such situations, federal agencies 
are essentially stuck in the same position as lower courts responding to the 
 
 159 See Thurmon, supra note 36, at 422 (noting that the problem caused by plurality opinions is lower 
courts following higher courts). 
 160 Indeed, Elizabeth Foote has argued that the entire Chevron framework, by casting what agencies do as 
statutory interpretation, was a misstep ab initio. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public 
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 
673, 674–95 (2007). While this Article pursues the less ambitious task of arguing that post-plurality federal 
agencies still have room to maneuver within the Chevron framework, rather than seeking to replace that 
framework, it nevertheless concurs with much of Foote’s argument. 
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Supreme Court’s plurality decision: they must interpret the Justices’ opinions 
in an attempt to discern a controlling legal rationale. 
To better illuminate the contours of the deference conundrum and the 
potential role of the Chevron/Brand X framework in agency responses to 
Supreme Court plurality decisions, this Part presents a typology of five 
categories of Supreme Court decisions regarding agency-mediated statutes—
decisions considering the statute’s constitutionality; decisions involving the 
implications of a statute beyond the immediate federal regulatory context, as in 
federal preemption; decisions assessing the validity of an agency rule or order 
on noninterpretive grounds; decisions interpreting an agency-mediated statute 
in the absence of an agency interpretation; and decisions assessing the validity 
of an existing agency interpretation. For each category, it discusses the 
implementing agency’s potential responses to plurality decisions from the 
Court. 
Importantly, the deference conundrum arises only in the last two categories 
of decisions within this typology. Within those two categories, however, the 
Chevron/Brand X framework gives agencies the opportunity to avoid the 
confusion and uncertainty that often follow from Supreme Court plurality 
decisions. 
A. Decisions on the Constitutionality of the Statute or the Agency’s 
Regulation 
As noted, one category of cases that is likely to prompt plurality opinions 
in the Supreme Court is constitutional cases—or more specifically for this 
Article, decisions on the constitutionality of federal statutes or agency 
regulations.161 For example, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,162 the Court issued 
a plurality decision regarding the constitutionality of the Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act), which “establishes a mechanism for 
funding health care benefits for retirees from the coal industry and their 
dependents”163 and is administered by the Commissioner of Social Security.164 
 
 161 Corley et al., supra note 27, at 180. 
 162 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 163 Id. at 504 (plurality opinion) (citing Pub. L. No. 102-486, 103 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 9701–9722 (2006))). 
 164 Id. at 514–15. 
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The plurality of Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, 
and Justice Thomas relied on the regulatory takings balancing test from Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to conclude that the Coal Act’s 
funding mechanism resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the employer’s 
(Eastern Enterprises’) money.165 Given its conclusion on the taking claim, the 
plurality did not decide Eastern Enterprises’ substantive due process claim.166 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment that the Coal Act was 
unconstitutional, but for entirely different reasons. He concluded that the Coal 
Act 
must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process principles, 
without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I 
concur in the judgment holding the Coal Act unconstitutional but 
disagree with the plurality’s Takings Clause analysis, which, it is 
submitted, is incorrect and quite unnecessary for decision of the 
case.167 
Justice Kennedy reached his due process conclusion because the Coal Act’s 
funding mechanisms operated retroactively.168 
The dissenters, in two opinions, would have declared the Coal Act 
constitutional. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, emphasized the historical context of the Coal Act to conclude that 
Congress’s solution was constitutional.169 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, essentially agreed with Justice Kennedy that 
the takings analysis was incorrect and that the Due Process Clause provided 
the proper basis for evaluating the Coal Act, focusing, like Justice Kennedy 
did, on the Coal Act’s retroactivity.170 Unlike Justice Kennedy, however, 
Justice Breyer concluded that the Coal Act’s retroactivity did not violate 
Eastern Enterprises’ due process rights, in large part because of the equities of 
Eastern Enterprises’ relationship with its miners.171 
 
 165 Id. at 522–23, 529, 532, 537 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978)). 
 166 Id. at 537–38. 
 167 Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 168 Id. at 547–50. 
 169 Id. at 550–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 170 Id. at 554–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 171 Id. at 558–68. 
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Thus, while Eastern Enterprises gave a clear decision that the funding 
mechanisms of the Coal Act were unconstitutional, it provided little guidance 
to lower courts regarding the proper framework for future evaluations of the 
constitutional validity of economic regulation. Lower federal courts have since 
struggled with that issue. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, applying Marks, 
concluded: 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the plurality in Eastern Enterprises 
would not constitute binding authority (i.e., would not constitute the 
narrower ground) under any of the several formulations of the Marks 
inquiry. We need not decide whether Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
constitutes the narrower ground, because we can assume arguendo 
that neither opinion constitutes the narrower ground, thus leaving us 
without binding authority, and leaving us with the obligation to 
independently evaluate the case law and determine for ourselves 
which approach is more consistent with the case law and more 
plausible.172 
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Takings Clause framework for 
evaluating the constitutionality of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act 
of 2004.173 Other lower federal courts174 and state courts175 have reached 
similar conclusions, and even the United States has argued in litigation that 
Eastern Enterprises does not constitute binding precedent for evaluating other 
statutes.176 Indeed, several lower federal courts have held that Eastern 
Enterprises does not even control their decisions regarding other applications 
of the Coal Act.177 
Nevertheless, while the Marks rule proves unhelpful in identifying a 
binding rationale in cases like Eastern Enterprises, post-plurality 
implementing federal agencies, like the Social Security Administration, cannot 
simply ignore the plurality decision, because federal courts routinely deny 
deference to agencies’ views of constitutional matters. This denial of deference 
comes in three closely related “flavors,” all of which could limit an agency’s 
 
 172 Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1054 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted). 
 173 Id. (construing 7 U.S.C. §§ 518–519(c) (2006)). 
 174 See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Dico, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 536, 541–42 (S.D. Iowa 1999), aff’d, 266 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 175 See Verizon W. Va., Inc. v. W. Va. Bureau of Emp’t Programs, Workers’ Comp. Div., 586 S.E.2d 170, 
189–92 (W. Va. 2003). 
 176 Dico, 189 F.R.D. at 541. 
 177 See Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1999); Ass’n of 
Bituminous Contractors v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 706, 716 (W.D. Va. 2000), rev’d, 269 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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ability to discount a Supreme Court plurality decision involving constitutional 
issues. 
First, and most basically, the federal courts have long proclaimed 
themselves the primary interpreters of the U.S. Constitution, especially with 
respect to the Executive Branch.178 As the D.C. Circuit proclaimed in 1988, 
“The federal Judiciary does not . . . owe deference to the Executive Branch’s 
interpretation of the Constitution.”179 Second, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that agency interpretations of statutes that themselves push the 
boundaries of constitutionality are not entitled to Chevron deference.180 Thus, 
if the Supreme Court issued a plurality decision suggesting that the agency’s 
prior interpretation of a statute raises constitutional issues, the agency would 
have to seriously consider the Justices’ arguments that its interpretation 
triggered constitutional concern in order to successfully claim deference in the 
next round of judicial review.181 Third, in construing statutes, “the 
constitutional avoidance canon of statutory interpretation trumps Chevron 
deference.”182 Under this canon, the federal court’s first duty is to find a 
constitutional interpretation of the federal statute at issue, and the courts “will 
not submit to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if it ‘presents serious 
constitutional difficulties.’”183 
The canon of constitutional avoidance also has implications for any Brand 
X analysis because federal courts are likely to accord greater precedential 
weight to prior judicial interpretations of a statute that were based on that 
canon—in Brand X’s terms, to regard those prior court decisions as decisively 
resolving statutory ambiguities. Two decisions from the federal courts of 
appeals, one before the Brand X decision and one after, illustrate this point. In 
 
 178 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704–05 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177–78 (1803); Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 179 Pub. Citizen v. Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 180 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001). 
 181 See, e.g., In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to accord Chevron deference 
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ interpretation of the Oil Pollution Act because the agency’s regulations 
raised constitutional issues). 
 182 Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. 
Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1249 (10th 
Cir. 2008); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 183 Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 512 F.3d at 711 (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995)). 
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University of Great Falls v. NLRB,184 the D.C. Circuit in 2002 refused to defer 
to the NLRB’s interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act185 (NLRA) 
as applied to the University of Great Falls, which claimed the exemption for 
religious institutions that the Supreme Court had established in NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.186 According to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the NLRA was based on constitutional avoidance and, 
as a result, the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA with respect to the 
University of Great Falls was not entitled to deference.187 
In 2007, post-Brand X, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion 
about its own constitutional avoidance precedent in Blake v. Carbone.188 In 
1976, the Second Circuit had construed specific provisions of the INA to avoid 
Equal Protection Clause infirmities.189 When the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service later tried to reinterpret those same provisions in ways 
that recreated the equal protection problems, the Second Circuit accorded no 
deference to the agency’s interpretation, emphasizing its own duty to interpret 
the statute to avoid constitutional problems.190 
Thus, the canon of constitutional avoidance severely attenuates the 
potential roles of both Chevron deference and the Brand X rule. In conjunction 
with the courts’ unwillingness to defer to an agency’s constitutional analysis or 
to agency interpretations of statutes that push constitutional boundaries, 
agencies coping with Supreme Court plurality decisions based on 
constitutional issues have few practical options other than to engage in their 
own Marks-rule analyses. The lesson for federal agencies dealing with 
plurality decisions in this category is thus stark: such agencies must cope as 
best they can—most likely, conservatively—with the constitutional concerns 
of the plurality Justices. 
 
 184 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 185 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2006). 
 186 Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1341 (citing 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979)). 
 187 Id. First, the NLRB was, in effect, an agency interpreting a court, not an agency interpreting a statute: 
“The application of Catholic Bishop to the facts of this case is thus an interpretation of precedent, rather than a 
statute, and for the court an occasion calling for the exercise of constitutional avoidance.” Id. Second, 
deference to the NLRB was especially unwarranted “where, as here, the Supreme Court precedent, and 
subsequent interpretation, is based on constitutional concerns, an area of presumed judicial, rather than 
administrative, competence.” Id. 
 188 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 189 Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 190 Blake, 489 F.3d at 100. 
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B. Decisions Invoking Statutory Interpretation for Purposes Beyond the 
Direct Regulatory Application of the Statute 
Most agency-mediated statutes are regulatory in character, and the federal 
agency’s primary function under the statute is to implement a regulatory 
program. Nevertheless, federal courts often interpret federal statutes for 
purposes other than resolving issues regarding federal implementation of the 
regulatory program. One of the most prominent of these extraregulatory (at 
least from the perspective of the federal agency implementing the statute) 
statutory construction issues is federal preemption. 
Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, which states that the 
laws of the United States, including the Federal Constitution, federal statutes, 
and treaties, “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . , any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”191 Unlike 
many provisions of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause is not a basis for 
declaring a federal statute unconstitutional; indeed, the Clause’s effect, if 
anything, is to reinforce the federal law. Instead, federal preemption analyses 
are concerned primarily with whether states can regulate in the same 
substantive sphere as the federal statute192 and whether the federal statute 
displaces state tort liability.193 Thus, when the Supreme Court issues a plurality 
decision regarding the preemptive effect of a federal statute, the entities left 
without clear legal guidance are state regulatory agencies and actual and 
potential tort victims. While important, these questions have little bearing on 
how the relevant federal agency chooses to implement the statute with respect 
 
 191 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
 192 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 
485 U.S. 293, 300–04 (1988); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 193 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1192 (2009); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 
434 (2005); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517–31 (1992). 
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to federally regulated entities.194 Deference to the implementing federal agency 
is not the relevant issue,195 and the deference conundrum does not arise. 
Consider, for example, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which raised the 
question of whether federally mandated warning labels on cigarettes preempted 
state-law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers.196 The Court split three 
ways, leaving the preemptive effect of the cigarette statutes and, more 
importantly, the process of preemption analysis in considerable doubt. 
A majority of Justices concluded that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling 
and Advertising Act197 (1965 Act) did not preempt state law tort claims.198 
Section 5 of that act addressed preemption and stated: 
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the 
statement required by section 4 of this Act [“Caution: Cigarette 
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health”], shall be required on 
any cigarette package. 
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in 
the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in 
conformity with the provisions of this Act.199 
Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, 
and Justice O’Connor, concluded that “on their face, these provisions merely 
prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular 
cautionary statements on cigarette labels (§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertisements 
(§ 5(b))” and that “there is no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-
emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state 
 
 194 If the implementing federal agency attempts to preempt state law through regulations, the interpretive 
and deference issues become intermixed. This intermixing raises provocative questions regarding federal 
agency authority that have not yet been fully resolved. However, the Chevron questions that arise do not differ 
significantly from questions that have arisen in other contexts regarding an agency’s authority to regulate when 
it claims deference. For recent scholarship exploring the issue of agency preemption, see generally Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 
197 (2009); William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 1233 (2010); and Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Preemption of State Common Law by Federal 
Agency Action: Striking the Appropriate Balance that Protects Public Safety, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1203 (2010). 
 195 See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1996) (emphasizing that the questions of 
whether a federal statute preempts state law and whether an agency’s interpretation of the same statute should 
be given deference are separate). 
 196 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992). 
 197 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 (2006)). 
 198 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519–20. 
 199 § 5(a)–(b), 79 Stat. at 283. 
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common-law damages actions.”200 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice 
Kennedy and Justice Souter, concurred in Stevens’s conclusion because “[t]he 
narrow scope of federal pre-emption is . . . apparent from the statutory text, 
and it is correspondingly impossible to divine any ‘clear and manifest purpose’ 
on the part of Congress to pre-empt common-law damages actions.”201 In 
contrast, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the 1965 Act 
preempted failure-to-warn claims202 because of the 1965 Act’s general 
prohibition on “statements” relating to smoking and health.203 
Congress changed the relevant preemption provisions when it enacted the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (1969 Act), amending 
section 5(b) to read: “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and 
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity 
with the provisions of this Act.”204 According to Justice Stevens’ plurality, 
“[T]he plain language of the pre-emption provision in the 1969 Act is much 
broader.”205 However, the plurality analyzed the plaintiff’s tort claims claim by 
claim using what has become known as the “predicate-duty approach”206 and 
concluded that (1) the 1969 Act created the only relevant duty regarding 
warnings and thus preempted failure-to-warn claims against cigarette 
manufacturers that allege that the manufacturers should have provided 
additional warnings;207 (2) the 1969 Act did not create duties regarding the 
companies’ testing or research practices and thus did not preempt failure-to-
warn claims based solely on those activities;208 (3) the 1969 Act did not govern 
duties regarding promises in advertising and thus did not preempt breach-of-
express-warranty claims;209 (4) the 1969 Act did not preempt fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims for similar reasons;210 and (5) the 1969 Act did not 
preempt conspiracy claims because those were unrelated to safety 
 
 200 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. 
 201 Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 202 Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 203 Id. at 549–50. 
 204 Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 
(2006)). 
 205 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion). 
 206 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 552 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 207 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion). 
 208 Id. at 524–25. 
 209 Id. at 525–27. 
 210 Id. at 527–29. 
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regulation.211 Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter found “the plurality’s 
conclusion that the 1969 Act pre-empts at least some common-law damages 
claims little short of baffling,” because the 1969 amendment “no more 
‘clearly’ or ‘manifestly’ exhibits an intent to pre-empt state common-law 
damages actions than did the language of its predecessor in the 1965 Act.”212 
In contrast, Justices Scalia and Thomas found that the 1969 Act preempted all 
of the common law claims.213 
To a certain extent, therefore, Cipollone did provide states and potential 
tort plaintiffs with real answers: the 1965 Act does not preempt any state law 
tort claims (7–2), and the 1969 Act preempts state law failure-to-warn claims 
(6–3), but it does not preempt four other kinds of damages claims (7–2). 
However, the fractured nature of the opinion and, in particular, the fact that 
only a plurality supported the predicate-duty approach to preemption analysis, 
provided little guidance to lower courts deciding whether the 1965 or 1969 
Acts preempted other kinds of state law claims. Indeed, the lower courts split 
regarding whether the 1969 Act preempted tort claims based on alleged 
manufacturer fraud regarding the safety of “light” cigarettes. The Fifth Circuit 
analogized such claims to “warning neutralization” claims and held that the 
1969 Act, as construed in Cipollone, preempted them.214 In contrast, the First 
Circuit analogized the claims to fraud claims and held that, under Cipollone, 
they were not preempted.215 Granting certiorari to review the First Circuit’s 
decision, a 5–4 Supreme Court adopted the Cipollone plurality’s predicate-
duty approach and agreed with the First Circuit that the 1969 Act did not 
preempt the claim.216 The Court reached this holding even over the dissent’s 
objection that a majority of Justices in Cipollone had rejected that approach.217 
Nevertheless, a decade and a half of uncertainty over how to analyze the 
cigarette warning’s preemption of state tort law had little impact on the Food 
and Drug Administration’s regulation of cigarette warnings,218 demonstrating 
 
 211 Id. at 530. 
 212 Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 213 Id. at 544, 551–55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 214 Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383, 392–93 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 215 Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 37, 40–43 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
 216 Good, 129 S. Ct. at 545–46. 
 217 Id. at 552 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 218 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,544 (Aug. 28, 1996). This regulation was later invalidated 
for lack of authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26, 142–43, 159–60 
(2000). 
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that the deference conundrum is unlikely to arise for this category of Supreme 
Court opinions. Even if it did, the Supreme Court has suggested—consistent 
with the federal courts’ view of their primacy in constitutional interpretation in 
general—that it would be unwilling to defer to an agency’s view of a statute’s 
preemptive effect,219 even though the Court will accord “some weight”—
recently identified as Skidmore deference—to an agency’s view of whether 
state law conflicts with an agency regulation having the force of law.220 
C. Decisions Regarding the Validity of Noninterpretive Agency Action 
The Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference framework applies only to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute that it implements, but the Federal APA 
supplies courts with a variety of reasons for overturning agency action.221 The 
deference conundrum does not arise from—and Brand X affords an agency no 
additional options for responding to—Supreme Court plurality decisions that 
evaluate agency actions on these other grounds, such as procedural compliance 
or evidentiary support. 
For example, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Supreme Court 
splintered badly regarding the legitimacy of the FCC’s attempts to prosecute 
Fox Television for two violations of the FCC’s indecency restrictions for 
public broadcasts, through which the FCC implements the Communications 
Act.222 While the FCC’s implementation of this prohibition was originally 
limited to the use of sexual or scatological terms for their literal meanings, in 
2004 it indicated for the first time that nonliteral (or explicative) use of the 
prohibited words could also be actionable.223 The FCC cited Fox Television for 
broadcasting Cher’s use of forbidden expletives during the 2002 Billboard 
Music Awards and for broadcasting Nicole Richie’s use of forbidden 
expletives during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards.224 
 
 219 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (“[A]gencies have no special authority to 
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress . . . .”); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 
1, 20–21 (2007) (discounting an agency regulation and determining for itself whether a statute preempted state 
law); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (“We may assume (without deciding) that 
the . . . question [of whether a statute is preemptive] must always be decided de novo by the courts.”). 
 220 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 221 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 222 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2009) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) and Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2006))). 
 223 Id. at 1807. 
 224 Id. at 1808. 
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The issues for the Supreme Court were (1) whether the FCC had properly 
followed the APA’s procedures in issuing its orders against Fox Television; (2) 
whether the FCC’s application of the indecency rules to the broadcasts was 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; and, in the background of the case, (3) 
whether the FCC’s orders violated the First Amendment.225 However, the 
plurality nature of the decision—in essence, a 4–1–4 split—arose from how the 
various Justices’ opinions framed the proper scope of arbitrary-and-capricious 
review when a federal agency changes its policy on how to implement a 
statute. 
The Court first held, 5–4, that the FCC changing its position on what 
constituted a violation of the indecency prohibitions did not warrant more 
stringent review under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard.226 Justice 
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and, 
nominally at least, Justice Kennedy, thus purported to apply the usual 
arbitrary-and-capricious analysis. Nevertheless, in the context of an agency’s 
changed policy, they also emphasized, “To be sure, the requirement that an 
agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand 
that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for 
example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that 
are still on the books.”227 
A majority of Justices concluded that the FCC’s implementation was not 
arbitrary and capricious. Justice Scalia’s opinion upheld the FCC largely 
because “[i]t was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to 
distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words” and because 
technological advances made it much easier for broadcasters to “bleep” out any 
offending uses of prohibited words.228 
Justice Kennedy complicated what could have been a clear majority 
approach. Although concurring in the judgment and nominally concurring in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to establish a new 
standard for arbitrary-and-capricious review in the context of changed 
policies—a standard that differed markedly from Justice Scalia’s.229 In 
essence, Justice Kennedy eschewed a one-size-fits-all analysis for a more 
 
 225 Id. at 1810–12. 
 226 Id. at 1810–11. 
 227 Id. at 1811. 
 228 Id. at 1812–13. 
 229 Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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nuanced approach to arbitrary-and-capricious review that depends on the 
agency’s exact circumstances and motivations for changing policy.230 
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
insisted that agencies changing policies must explain, in a meaningful way 
relative to the initial decision, not just why the new policy was rational but also 
why exactly the agency had decided to change policies.231 Because the FCC 
did not sufficiently explain the reasons for its change in policy, the dissenters 
declared its orders against Fox Television arbitrary and capricious.232 
Fox Television thus leaves federal courts with multiple rules for how to 
approach arbitrary-and-capricious review when a federal agency changes 
policy, especially because Justice Kennedy’s view of that standard aligns more 
readily with the four dissenters’ than the majority’s, despite his concurrence in 
the judgment. Nevertheless, the decision does not trigger the deference 
conundrum for two reasons. First, no federal agency is authorized to interpret 
the APA itself. Second, agency decisions subject to arbitrary-and-capricious 
review are, almost by definition, not subject to Chevron deference, and hence 
the Brand X rule is not relevant.233 The same would be true in the aftermath of 
Supreme Court plurality decisions regarding whether the agency had correctly 
followed the APA’s procedures234 or whether the agency’s decision was 
supported by substantial evidence.235 In such circumstances, post-plurality 
agencies must do their best to interpret the Justices’ rationales and to try to 
correct the deficiencies that at least some Justices discerned. 
 
 230 Id. at 1822–23. Justice Kennedy stated: 
The question whether a change in policy requires an agency to provide a more-reasoned 
explanation than when the original policy was first announced is not susceptible, in my view, to 
an answer that applies in all cases. . . .  
The question in each case is whether the agency’s reasons for the change, when viewed in 
light of the data available to it, and when informed by the experience and expertise of the agency, 
suffice to demonstrate that the new policy rests upon principles that are rational, neutral, and in 
accord with the agency’s proper understanding of its authority. 
Id. 
 231 Id. at 1829–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 232 Id. at 1829. 
 233 See Garcia v. Shanahan, 615 F. Supp. 2d 175, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[B]ecause the instant case is 
one calling only for statutory interpretation, . . . the Court does not find . . . the Fox Television decision to 
affect the outcome in this case.”). 
 234 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting out procedures for informal rulemaking); id. §§ 554, 556–557 
(setting out procedures for formal rulemaking and adjudication); id. § 706(2)(D) (allowing the federal courts to 
set aside agency action when the agency did not follow the correct procedures). 
 235 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (establishing the “substantial evidence” standard of review). 
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D. Decisions Engaging in Statutory Interpretation in the Absence of an 
Agency Interpretation 
In the prototypical Brand X situation, a court has interpreted a statute that 
an agency implements, in the absence of an existing agency regulation, and 
then the agency wants to interpret the statute differently than the court did. In 
fact, the question in Brand X itself was whether the Ninth Circuit was correct 
to follow its own precedent in interpreting the Communications Act or whether 
it should have accorded Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation.236 The 
Brand X majority clearly subordinated court interpretations to agency 
interpretations in this situation, concluding, as discussed, that “[a] court’s prior 
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves 
no room for agency discretion.”237 
Brand X left at least two questions regarding its scope. First, because the 
case dealt with Chevron deference and later agency interpretations that were 
clearly “otherwise entitled to Chevron deference,”238 it provides little guidance 
regarding how courts should treat existing court precedent when later and 
contrary agency interpretations are not entitled to Chevron deference. 
Nevertheless, lower courts have found or implied that the Brand X rule applies 
only to agency interpretations that otherwise are entitled to Chevron 
deference,239 which is consistent with the special status of Chevron deference. 
Chevron deference respects Congress’s decision to invest interpretive authority 
in agencies rather than courts—so long as the agency deliberatively exercises 
delegated lawmaking authority. As the Brand X majority emphasized, if the 
two analytical steps are met, “Chevron requires a federal court to accept the 
agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from 
what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”240 In contrast, 
lesser standards of deference do not demand that a court give up its prerogative 
 
 236 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979–83 (2005). 
 237 Id. at 982. 
 238 Id. 
 239 See, e.g., Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.3d 1303, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (refusing 
to apply the Brand X rule to an interpretation that warranted only Skidmore deference); White & Case LLP v. 
United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 12, 22 (2009) (“To the extent that the term ‘case’ was construed by the Court of 
Claims in Cornman, however, this holding and related determinations continue to bind our Court—until the 
agency changes its construction of the statute in a manner garnering Chevron deference.”). 
 240 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 990 (2005) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843–44 & n.11 (1984)). 
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to discern the “best” interpretation of a statute. For example, under Skidmore 
deference, an agency interpretation receives deference only to the extent that it 
has the “power to persuade.”241 
Second, as noted in Part I, the Justices disagree as to whether the Brand X 
rule encompasses the Supreme Court’s own interpretations of statutes. There is 
nothing in the majority’s rule that would exclude Supreme Court decisions, 
and scholarship has argued that Supreme Court interpretations should be 
included within the scope of the Brand X rule.242 Conversely, as noted, Justice 
Stevens concurred specifically in Brand X to indicate that Supreme Court 
decisions do resolve statutory ambiguities, precluding application of the Brand 
X rule.243 Scholars, too, have displayed some queasiness regarding the 
implications of applying the Brand X rule to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of statutes,244 and the Supreme Court has failed to apply Brand 
X to its own decisions, although usually not with explanation.245 
Nevertheless, any squeamishness about applying the Brand X rule to 
constructions of statutes endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court Justices 
should dissipate in the context of plurality decisions that offer no majority 
interpretation. Moreover, Brand X should apply to Supreme Court plurality 
decisions that interpret a statute that a federal agency implements even if the 
Marks rule could easily provide a controlling rationale. 
To begin, of course, not all—and perhaps very few—Supreme Court 
plurality decisions even fit the Marks-rule structure. For example, in the most 
extreme version of a plurality decision, an equally divided Court issues no 
opinion. Thus, in Borden Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CWA’s prohibition of 
“discharge[s] of any pollutant” into the nation’s waters to extend to “deep 
ripping” wetlands, a procedure “in which four- to seven-foot long metal prongs 
 
 241 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 242 See Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1247, 1250–52; Doug Geyser, 
Note, Courts Still “Say What the Law Is”: Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand 
X, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2131 n.13 (2006). 
 243 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 244 See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997, 
1015–16, 1023 (2007); Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1532, 1533 (2006); Darren H. Weiss, Note, X Misses the Spot: Fernandez v. Keisler and the 
(Mis)Appopriation of Brand X by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 893, 908–
09 (2010). 
 245 See Robin Kundis Craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts Court: The First Four Years, 62 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 69, 172–86 (2010). 
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are dragged through the soil behind a tractor or a bulldozer,” destroying the 
confining bottom layer of the wetland and allowing the wetland to drain.246 
While this interpretation is questionable, the Ninth Circuit did not defer to any 
interpretation by the U.S. Army Corps or the EPA to reach it, instead relying 
solely on statutory definitions and prior case law.247 The Supreme Court, 
however, failed to provide any guidance regarding the correctness of the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation or the validity of its reasoning. Instead, the entirety of 
the Court’s opinion was as follows: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally 
divided Court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case.”248 
In this extreme situation, it is difficult to conclude that the Supreme Court 
has issued any interpretation of the statute; instead, it has merely applied its 
default rule that 4–4 splits among the Justices affirm the lower court.249 Indeed, 
the Court itself has noted that a 4–4 “judgment amounts at best to nothing 
more than an unexplained affirmance by an equally divided court—a judgment 
not entitled to precedential weight no matter what reasoning may have 
supported it.”250 As a result, if the Army Corps and the EPA wanted to 
promulgate a regulation, using full notice-and-comment rulemaking, that 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation—and if it concluded that the 
CWA does not extend to deep ripping—Brand X should apply to that 
regulation. In other words, the regulation should receive Chevron deference, 
despite the Supreme Court’s nominal affirmance of the lower court’s view. 
Even in Supreme Court plurality decisions with substantial opinions, it 
cannot always be said that the Court has actually and definitively interpreted 
the statute at issue. Even if Justice Stevens’s caveat to Brand X is assumed to 
be part of the Brand X rule, that caveat presumes that the Supreme Court’s 
decision “remove[s] any pre-existing ambiguity.”251 In contrast, interpretations 
 
 246 Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 812–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006)), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided 
court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002). 
 247 Id. at 814–15. 
 248 Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. at 100. 
 249 See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 (1868) (noting the default rule but clarifying that 
the actual decision is binding on the parties involved); Hemmenway v. Fisher, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 255, 260 
(1857) (noting the default rule); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006) (applying the default rule to cases where the 
Supreme Court does not have a quorum). 
 250 Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 304 (1996). 
 251 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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of statutes in plurality decisions tend to underscore, rather than remove, 
statutory ambiguities. As John Davis and William Reynolds observed, “[A] 
plurality opinion is not, strictly speaking, an opinion of the Court as an 
institution; it represents nothing more than the views of the individual justices 
who join in the opinion.”252 As a result, “[A] plurality opinion often fails to 
give definitive guidance as to the state of the law to lower courts—both state 
and federal—as well as to the legislative, administrative, and executive 
agencies charged with implementing the standards so ambivalently articulated 
by the Court.”253 
For example, in Lukhard v. Reed, the Supreme Court split 4–1–4 regarding 
whether states could legitimately interpret “income” to include personal injury 
awards for purposes of determining the eligibility of families seeking Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).254 At the federal level, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implements this program, 
but the structure of the program leaves states with considerable discretion to 
interpret details. In the wake of 1981 legislation amending the program, for 
example, the Secretary of HHS “advised the States to adhere to their existing 
definitions of income.”255 
After the case was filed, the Secretary of HHS promulgated a regulation 
that required states to treat lump-sum awards as income.256 Nevertheless, the 
four-Justice plurality (Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, 
and Justice Stevens) declined to decide the case on the basis of that 
regulation,257 engaging instead in straightforward statutory interpretation to 
determine whether the State of Virginia’s regulation regarding the treatment of 
income was legitimate.258 The plurality rather weakly upheld Virginia’s 
decision to treat personal injury awards as income, concluding not that the 
federal statutes clearly supported that interpretation but rather only that 
“[r]espondents have not demonstrated that Virginia’s policy of treating 
 
 252 Davis & Reynolds, supra note 137, at 61. 
 253 Id. at 62. 
 254 481 U.S. 368 (1987) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). AFDC was replaced by 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families in 1996. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492–93 (1999). 
 255 Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 385 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 47 
Fed. Reg. 5648, 5656 (Feb. 5, 1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 205–206, 232–235, 238–239)). 
 256 Id. at 379 n.5 (plurality opinion) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986) and Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children Adult Assistance Programs, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,558, 45,568 (proposed Nov. 16, 1984) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 201, 205–206, 225, 232–235, 237)). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
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personal injury awards as income is inconsistent with the AFDC statute or 
HHS’ regulations.”259 
Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
O’Connor. Looking at federal treatment of personal injury awards, they 
concluded that, “[i]n a variety of circumstances, Congress has recognized that 
injured persons and their families should be permitted to retain the full amount 
of [tort and workers’ compensation] awards,” and hence that “[i]t is unjust, and 
inconsistent with the basic purposes of the AFDC statute, to deny needy 
families the compensation our legal system affords to the rest of society.”260 
That left Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the plurality’s decision to 
reverse the lower court but nothing else. His opinion, in its entirety, was as 
follows: 
I join the judgment of the Court but not the opinion of the 
plurality, for I would base my vote to reverse not on an endorsement 
of the original Virginia interpretation but, flatly, on the deference that 
is due the Secretary of Health and Human Services in his 
interpretation of the governing statutes. In a statutory area as 
complicated as this one, the administrative authorities are far more 
able than this Court to determine congressional intent in the light of 
experience in the field. If the result is unacceptable to Congress, it 
has only to clarify the situation with language that unambiguously 
specifies its intent.261 
Thus, Justice Blackmun not only refused to join the plurality’s reasoning but 
also explicitly invoked deference to federal agencies as the preferred 
alternative approach. 
Lukhard, a 1987 decision, preceded Brand X by almost two decades. 
Moreover, the Secretary’s regulation treating personal injury awards as income 
remains in place.262 Nevertheless, as an intellectual exercise, it remains 
worthwhile to ask whether Lukhard in any way foreclosed HHS’s ability to 
interpret the federal statutes to reach the opposite conclusion—that states 
cannot consider personal injury awards to be income for purposes of the 
AFDC program. 
 
 259 Id. at 383. 
 260 Id. at 391–92 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 261 Id. at 383–84 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 262 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (2011). 
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The most intellectually honest conclusion is that the plurality decision had 
no such preclusive effect. Indeed, the very existence of the plurality opinions 
undermines any conclusion that the Supreme Court interpreted the AFDC 
statutes to remove all ambiguity regarding the scope of “income.” The four 
dissenting Justices clearly thought that the alternative interpretation (personal 
injury awards are not income) was the better one, and Justice Blackmun would 
have preferred to decide the case based on deference to the HHS. Under the 
Marks rule, there is no narrowest grounds rationale to support the majority 
decision. Moreover, as a pragmatic matter, the concurrence and the dissent 
together suggest that five Justices would have deferred to (and upheld) the 
HHS’s interpretation if it had promulgated a regulation embodying the 
dissent’s interpretation. 
In addition, the plurality opinion itself offers no definitive interpretation of 
the statute. The plurality was not trying to determine what the Federal AFDC 
statutes absolutely require but rather whether Virginia’s policy was consistent 
with them. Thus, for example, the plurality concluded, after reviewing 
dictionary definitions, that “Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with a 
perfectly natural use of ‘income’”263—but it also acknowledged that federal 
law had treated personal injury awards differently.264 Similarly, it concluded 
that “personal injury awards are almost entirely a gain in well-being, as well-
being is measured under the AFDC statute, and can reasonably be treated as 
income”265—not that they must or even should be treated as such. The 
complexity of the issue also contributed to the reasonableness of Virginia’s 
policy and simultaneously suggested that other views might be equally 
reasonable: “Compensating for the noneconomic inequities of life is a task 
daunting in its complexity, and the AFDC statute is neither designed nor 
interpreted unreasonably if it leaves them untouched.”266 Finally, upholding 
Virginia’s policy accorded the state “solicitude” in a federalist system267—but 
that consideration has little bearing on whether the plurality was definitively 
construing the federal statutes. 
Thus, in a Brand X world, the HHS—and any federal agency reviewing its 
regulations or orders after a Supreme Court plurality decision relevant to a 
statute that the agency implements—should be able to claim Chevron 
 
 263 Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 376 (plurality opinion). 
 264 Id. at 376–77. 
 265 Id. at 381. 
 266 Id. at 382–83. 
 267 Id. at 383. 
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deference for any post-plurality agency interpretation that would otherwise be 
entitled to Chevron deference. Even if Justice Stevens’s caveat is considered 
part of the Brand X rule, the Supreme Court plurality decision here did not 
remove the ambiguity because it did not offer a definitive interpretation of the 
statute. 
But what if the Supreme Court issues a plurality opinion where the Marks 
rule could easily apply—where the various interpretations of the statute 
represent broadening viewpoints? Should the courts apply Marks to eliminate 
the agency’s Brand X authority to reinterpret, or should Brand X trump Marks? 
Even assuming that Justice Stevens’s concurrence is part of the Brand X rule, 
reasonable minds could differ on this point, but the better argument is that 
Brand X should trump Marks. First, to the extent that the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional role is “to say what the law is,”268 any plurality decision 
represents an abdication of that role.269 As a normative matter, therefore, it is 
difficult to articulate why, under Brand X, federal agencies can displace the 
majoritarian—or even unanimous—interpretation of a federal court of appeals 
but not the plurality interpretation of four or fewer Justices. 
Second, as a practical matter, a Marks-amenable plurality decision 
interpreting a statute would most likely consist of a series of progressively 
more expansive views of what a statutory term encompasses. An application of 
Marks could thus constrain agency policymaking discretion in ways that 
violate the spirit of Chevron. For example, assume that application of a statute 
that a federal agency implements depends on the meaning of a given term 
within the statute. At the Supreme Court, all nine Justices agree that the term 
includes A, but one concludes that it includes only A; three conclude that it 
includes A and B; one concludes that the term includes A, B, and C; two 
conclude that it includes A and D; and two conclude that it includes A, D, and 
E. The Supreme Court has failed to proffer an exact definition of the critical 
term, but heavy-handed application of Marks in this situation would limit the 
statutory regime to A, even though eight Justices believed that the statute 
should apply more broadly. Brand X, in contrast, would allow the 
implementing agency to determine just how broadly the statutory regime 
should apply as a matter of policy—a result more clearly in line with the 
principles of Chevron than the Marks rule. 
 
 268 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 269 Berkolow, supra note 17, at 301; Bloom, supra note 27, at 1373, 1378–79; Kimura, supra note 26, at 
1625; Ledebur, supra note 18, at 919; Note, supra note 27, at 1127–28. 
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This discussion can be summarized into the Chevron two-step analysis as 
follows. First, at Chevron Step One, no Supreme Court plurality opinion 
definitively removes all statutory ambiguity. Even when the Marks rule 
applies, the decision will not completely circumscribe the meaning of the 
statute at issue. Second, at Chevron Step Two, most Supreme Court plurality 
decisions will not even provide definitive guidance regarding the 
reasonableness of various interpretations, either because the Supreme Court 
offers no opinion at all or because the Justices’ opinions are mutually 
contradictory. For certain plurality opinions, however, the Marks rule might 
elucidate the potential bounds of agency interpretive reasonableness. For 
example, in the hypothetical in the previous paragraph, operation of the Marks 
logic indicates that the agency would have a difficult time interpreting the 
relevant statutory term to not include A. 
Nevertheless, in a Brand X world, plurality decisions in this category leave 
the agencies much latitude to continue to interpret the statutes that they 
implement. However, given the existence of judicial precedent in this situation 
(the lower courts’ decisions, if not the Supreme Court’s plurality decision) and 
the probable inapplicability of the Brand X rule outside the realm of Chevron 
deference, agencies are well-advised to issue post-plurality interpretations 
through procedures that would entitle the interpretation to Chevron deference. 
E. Decisions Regarding the Validity of the Implementing Agency’s 
Interpretation of the Statute 
In the last category of this typology, the Supreme Court issues a plurality 
decision regarding the legitimacy of an existing agency interpretation of a 
statute. To assess the validity of the agency’s interpretation, the Court must 
necessarily engage in its own construction of the statute, such as in Chevron’s 
Step One. As such, this category of plurality opinions raises all of the Brand X 
considerations that the previous category did, and the Justices’ plurality 
interpretations are again unlikely to definitively remove all statutory 
ambiguity. However, because the Justices are also evaluating an existing 
agency interpretation, their plurality opinions are more likely to constrain the 
agency’s post-decision reinterpretation of the statute than when the Court 
engages in unmediated statutory interpretation. 
The Federal CWA’s application to “navigable waters” has long raised 
complex issues of statutory interpretation, resulting in the Supreme Court’s 
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plurality decision in Rapanos v. United States in June 2006.270 Some statutory 
background is necessary to give context to the deference conundrum that the 
Army Corps and EPA now face in the aftermath of this decision. Moreover, 
because Rapanos is the basis for this Article’s case study in Part IV, I present 
that decision in some detail here. 
The CWA forbids “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” except as 
in compliance with the CWA, which generally requires that a discharger obtain 
a permit.271 The CWA further defines “discharge of a pollutant” and 
“discharge of pollutants” to be “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source,”272 with “navigable waters” being “the waters of 
the United States, including the territorial seas.”273 
The two agencies that implement the CWA—the EPA274 and the Army 
Corps275—issued identical notice-and-comment regulations broadly defining 
“waters of the United States.” These regulations have been in place, virtually 
unchanged, since 1982.276 
The Supreme Court has addressed the validity of these regulations three 
times, the last of which was in Rapanos. In its first decision in 1985, United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court had to decide whether to uphold 
the Army Corps’ decision (and, by implication, the EPA’s parallel decision) to 
include wetlands adjacent to a larger body of water within the scope of the 
CWA’s “waters of the United States.”277 In its unanimous decision, the Court 
upheld the regulatory definition, reasoning that protection of aquatic 
ecosystems demanded broad federal authority to control pollution because 
“[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of 
pollutants be controlled at the source.”278 The Court accorded the regulation 
 
 270 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 271 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
 272 Id. § 1362(12). 
 273 Id. § 1362(7). The CWA broadly defines “pollutant” to include almost any waste added to water. Id. 
§ 1362(6). A “point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” such as a pipe or ditch. Id. 
§ 1362(14). A “person” is “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, 
commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” Id. § 1362(5). 
 274 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2010). 
 275 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2010). 
 276 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 132–33 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1971)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Chevron deference279 and upheld the agencies’ interpretation as reasonable, 
concluding that “the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of 
water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the 
Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters 
as more conventionally defined.”280 
It was slightly more than fifteen years before the Supreme Court again 
addressed the agencies’ regulations defining “waters of the United States” in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (SWANCC).281 This case resulted in a 5–4 decision on the validity of 
the Army Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule.”282 In 1986, in an attempt to clarify its 
definition of “waters of the United States,” the Army Corps published a 
nonregulatory explanation of its regulations. Under this explanation, the Army 
Corps noted that it would assert CWA jurisdiction over intrastate waters that 
“are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird 
Treaties”; that “are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which 
cross state lines”; that “are or would be used as habitat for endangered 
species”; or that are “[u]sed to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.”283 
The Migratory Bird Rule thus clearly contemplated federal regulation of 
waters that had no immediate connection to larger waters of the United States, 
which became the key issue in SWANCC. 
In SWANCC, the Army Corps had relied on migratory birds’ use of filling 
ponds in an abandoned sand and gravel pit to conclude that the Solid Waste 
Agency needed a CWA permit before filling those ponds, despite the fact that 
the ponds had no apparent connection to other larger waters.284 When the 
Army Corps refused to issue a permit, the Solid Waste Agency challenged the 
denial, arguing that the filling ponds were outside the Army Corps’ CWA 
jurisdiction.285 A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, concluding most 
explicitly “that the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ is not fairly supported by the 
CWA.”286 However, the SWANCC Court also indicated interpretive limitations 
 
 279 Id. at 131. 
 280 Id. at 133. 
 281 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 282 Id. at 162, 164. 
 283 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 
1986). 
 284 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164–65. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. at 167. 
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beyond the Migratory Bird Rule itself.287 According to the majority, “It was 
the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that 
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.”288 As a 
result, the majority strongly suggested that the CWA’s scope did not extend to 
isolated wetlands and ponds because Congress’s use of “navigable waters” in 
the statute “has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as 
its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that 
were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”289 
Moreover, the Court refused to defer to the Army Corps’ more expansive view 
of CWA jurisdiction because that interpretation “alters the federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power,” 
raising constitutional concerns.290 
Thus, going into the Rapanos decision, the Supreme Court had 
unanimously deferred to the agencies’ conclusion that CWA “navigable 
waters” included wetlands adjacent to larger waters, but refused to accord 
deference and effectively invalidated the agencies’ extension of “navigable 
waters” to isolated, intrastate waters, citing federalism concerns. Rapanos 
raised the interim issue: can CWA “navigable waters” or “waters of the United 
States,” as the agencies had concluded by regulation, include wetlands adjacent 
to smaller tributaries of traditional navigable waters?291 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos did little to clarify the exact 
scope of CWA “waters of the United States,” producing a 4–1–4 split among 
the Justices and five opinions. Justice Scalia authored the plurality opinion, 
which focused on the plain meaning of “the waters of the United States” to 
conclude that the CWA extends only “to water ‘[a]s found in streams and 
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes’ or 
‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams 
or bodies.’”292 As a result, according to the plurality, jurisdiction under the 
CWA exists only for “those relatively permanent, standing or continuously 
 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. at 172 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–08 (1940)). 
 290 Id. at 173. “Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within 
the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary 
power over land and water use.” Id. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 
(1994)). 
 291 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 292 Id. at 732–33 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 
(2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]). 
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flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in 
ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”293 As for 
wetlands, “[O]nly those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to 
bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there is 
no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such 
waters and covered by the [CWA].”294 
The plurality also emphasized that its interpretation was the “only plausible 
interpretation” of “waters of the United States.”295 Thus, the plurality 
suggested that it was consciously foreclosing the application of Brand X to 
future agency interpretations.296 
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the plurality, authored his own opinion to 
speak more directly to the issue of deference and the agencies’ prerogatives. 
According to Chief Justice Roberts, “Agencies delegated rulemaking authority 
under a statute such as the Clean Water Act are afforded generous leeway by 
the courts in interpreting the statute they are entrusted to administer.”297 
However: 
Rather than refining its view of its authority in light of our decision in 
SWANCC, and providing guidance meriting deference under our 
generous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially 
boundless view of the scope of its power. The upshot today is another 
defeat for the agency.298 
Chief Justice Roberts also anticipated that “[l]ower courts and regulated 
entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis,” citing a 
discussion of Marks and implying that the agencies were no longer directly 
relevant to the interpretation of “waters of the United States.”299 Almost all of 
 
 293 Id. at 739 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S, supra note 292, at 2882). 
 294 Id. at 742. 
 295 Id. at 739. 
 296 See Helen Thigpen, Note, The Plurality Paradox: Rapanos v. U.S. and the Uncertain Future of 
Federal Wetlands Protection, 28 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 89, 107 (2007) (arguing that the plurality 
engaged in “near total dismissal of the Corps’ and the EPA’s expertise in environmental protection and 
hydrology”). 
 297 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)). 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003)). 
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the scholarship regarding the interpretive aftermath of Rapanos has made the 
same assumption300—an assumption this Article obviously challenges. 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment to remand, but little else. 
Instead, he authored his own opinion, arguing that the “significant nexus” test 
announced in SWANCC still governed CWA navigable waters/waters of the 
United States.301 As Justice Kennedy framed the issue, “[The] consolidated 
cases require the Court to decide whether the term ‘navigable waters’ in the 
Clean Water Act extends to wetlands that do not contain and are not adjacent 
to waters that are navigable in fact.”302 Reading Riverside Bayview and 
SWANCC together, he concluded: 
[I]n some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the 
connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable 
water may be so close, or potentially so close, that the Corps may 
deem the water or wetland a “navigable water” under the Act. In 
other instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no 
connection. Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is 
lacking.303 
Moreover, SWANCC’s significant-nexus test served to eliminate one category 
of waters from CWA jurisdiction—those isolated intrastate waters “that 
appeared likely, as a category, to raise constitutional difficulties and federalism 
concerns”304—while preserving the federal government’s legitimate concerns 
over water quality. 
In most other cases, however, jurisdiction over wetlands must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis.305 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy left much potential 
room for future regulations. First, he emphasized that “[a]s applied to wetlands 
 
 300 See, e.g., Berkolow, supra note 17, at 349 (emphasizing what the courts and legislatures can do in the 
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the plurality or that presented in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.” (emphasis added)); id. at 115 (focusing on 
the role of courts in resolving the interpretive problem that Rapanos left); see also Joshua C. Thomas, Note, 
Clearing the Muddy Waters? Rapanos and the Post-Rapanos Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Guidance, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1491, 1528–29 (2008) (arguing that agency regulations would be preferable to agency guidance 
and noting that the 2007 Rapanos Guidance “closely tracks the language of the Court’s opinion—as it must” 
(emphasis added)). 
 301 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. at 767. 
 304 Id. at 776. 
 305 Id. at 782. 
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adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’ conclusive standard for 
jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and 
the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the [CWA] 
by showing adjacency alone.”306 Second: 
Through regulations or adjudication, the Corps may choose to 
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow 
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, 
or other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands 
adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform 
important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable 
waters.307 
These “more specific regulations,” Justice Kennedy indicated, would eliminate 
the need for a case-by-case significant-nexus analysis.308 
Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, would have expanded CWA 
jurisdiction to fulfill its purposes of restoring and maintaining the integrity of 
the nation’s waters. Moreover, he explicitly would have accorded Chevron 
deference to the Army Corps’ (and EPA’s) regulations309 in acknowledged 
perpetuation and extension of the Riverside Bayview analysis.310 In fact, 
according to the dissenters, the case should have been entirely about Chevron 
deference because 
concerns about the appropriateness of the Corps’ 30-year 
implementation of the Clean Water Act should be addressed to 
Congress or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary. Whether the 
benefits of particular conservation measures outweigh their costs is a 
classic question of public policy that should not be answered by 
appointed judges.311 
The dissenters thus would have used a different approach in interpreting 
“waters of the United States” than that used by either Justice Scalia or Justice 
Kennedy. In light of the splits among the Justices, however, the dissenters 
complicated the plurality analysis by announcing that, “[g]iven that all four 
Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in 
 
 306 Id. at 780. 
 307 Id. at 780–81. 
 308 Id. at 782. 
 309 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 310 Id. at 788, 792 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 
(1984)). 
 311 Id. at 799. 
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both of these cases[,] . . . on remand each of the judgments should be reinstated 
if either of those tests is met.”312 
Justice Breyer, one of the dissenting Justices, authored the fifth Rapanos 
opinion and announced, “In my view, the authority of the Army Corps of 
Engineers under the Clean Water Act extends to the limits of congressional 
power to regulate interstate commerce.”313 Moreover, he viewed new agency 
regulations as imperative, under Chevron-like logic, because “[i]f one thing is 
clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps of Engineers to make the 
complex technical judgments that lie at the heart of the present cases (subject 
to deferential judicial review).”314 
Thus, the Rapanos Court split with regard to the proper test for figuring out 
what waters qualify as waters of the United States and with respect to the 
possibility and advisability of new agency regulations in the wake of the 
plurality decision. Regarding the deference conundrum and the potential 
applicability of Brand X, Rapanos—like Lukhard—offers three irreconcilable 
approaches to interpreting the statutory term at issue. Therefore, for all of the 
reasons argued in the previous category of this typology, Rapanos cannot be 
said to resolve all ambiguity regarding the scope of “waters of the United 
States,” leaving room for the EPA and the Army Corps to assert the Brand X 
rule and issue a new regulatory interpretation of the CWA. This category of 
Supreme Court plurality opinions, like the previous one, thus presents the 
involved agencies with the deference conundrum. 
Unlike in Lukhard, however, the Rapanos Court was evaluating the validity 
of the agencies’ interpretation, embodied in notice-and-comment regulations. 
Moreover, five Justices (the plurality and Justice Kennedy) found that 
interpretation wanting, at least as applied to certain waters. As a result, and not 
forgetting the majority decision in SWANCC, the EPA and the Army Corps 
cannot use Brand X to simply reissue their existing regulations interpreting 
“waters of the United States.” As was noted in Part I, even the lower federal 
courts would resist the application of Brand X in those circumstances.315 
Rapanos, despite its multiple opinions, does circumscribe the CWA’s 
ambiguity to some not-quite-precise extent beyond the SWANCC majority’s 
elimination of isolated waters. 
 
 312 Id. at 810. 
 313 Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 314 Id. at 811–12. 
 315 See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
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Thus, while under Brand X the EPA and Army Corps retain authority to 
reinterpret “waters of the United States,” they cannot simply ignore the 
Rapanos opinions. Instead, those opinions should operate as data points 
regarding the boundaries of interpretive reasonableness. Or, to put this 
category of Supreme Court plurality decisions into Chevron terms, the plurality 
decision does not change the answer at Chevron Step One because the statute 
remains ambiguous, but it does help to shape the analysis at Chevron Step Two 
by limiting the scope of a reasonable agency interpretation. 
 
THE TYPOLOGY OF SUPREME COURT PLURALITY DECISIONS 






The Court issues a 
plurality decision while 
ruling on a statute’s 
constitutionality. 
Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 
(1998) 
As a practical matter, 
the agency must 
interpret the Court’s 
interpretation to discern 
which parts of the 
statute, if any, remain 
valid, because courts 
will not defer to agency 






Purposes: The Court 
issues a plurality opinion 
while interpreting the 
statute for some purpose 
other than the agency’s 
direct implementation, 
such as federal 
preemption. 
Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, 505 U.S. 504 
(1992) 
The Court’s decision is 
largely irrelevant to the 
agency’s regulatory 
decisions and hence the 
deference conundrum is 
unlikely to arise. 
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Validity of a 
Noninterpretive Rule 
or Order: The Court 
issues a plurality opinion 
regarding the validity of 
an agency’s rule or order 
on grounds other than 
whether the rule or order 
properly interprets the 
statute—for example, 
whether a rule is 
arbitrary and capricious 
or the agency properly 
followed APA 
procedures. 
FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 1800 (2009) 
The deference 
conundrum does not 
arise because the 
agency’s interpretation 
of the statute is not the 
issue. If the agency 
wants to validate its 
action, it should resolve 
the identified 
problem(s) if it can. 
Statutory 
Interpretation in the 
Absence of an Agency 
Interpretation: The 
Court issues a plurality 
opinion regarding the 
meaning of an agency-
mediated statute in the 
absence of an existing 
agency interpretation. 
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 
U.S. 368 (1987) 
 
Borden Ranch 
Partnership v. United 
States Army Corps of 
Engineers, 537 U.S. 99 
(2002) 
The agency faces the 
deference conundrum, 
but Brand X should 
govern any formal 
interpretation that the 
agency issues, because 
there is no definitive 
Supreme Court 
interpretation of the 
statute. 
Validity of the 
Agency’s 
Interpretation: The 
Court issues a plurality 
opinion regarding 
whether the agency’s 
existing interpretation of 
the statute is valid. 
Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006) 
The agency faces the 
deference conundrum 
and indications from at 
least some Justices that 
there are problems with 
the agency’s current 
interpretation. Brand X 
should still apply 
because there is no 
definitive interpretation 
of the statute, but a wise 
agency will also view 
the Justices’ opinions as 
data points for its new 
interpretation. 
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IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE DEFERENCE CONUNDRUM: RESPONSES TO RAPANOS 
V. UNITED STATES 
As noted in Part III, Rapanos v. United States presented the EPA and the 
Army Corps with a clear deference conundrum. Moreover, the agencies’ 
choice regarding what do to in the wake of Rapanos was—and remains—
important because the definition of “waters of the United States” delimits the 
scope of federal regulatory authority under the CWA. Continuing dissensus 
regarding what qualifies as a water of the United States has created confusion 
for the lower courts,316 increased the EPA’s and Army Corps’ regulatory 
burden and frustrated their regulatory responsibilities,317 left possibly regulated 
entities with unclear and nationally divided rules, and caused a potentially 
time-consuming and expensive process for determining whether and how they 
will be regulated.318 Indeed, the EPA reported in 2009 that “[i]t has been 
difficult for EPA to craft jurisdictional determination guidance that is both 
legal [under Rapanos] and usable for field staff.”319 So far, however, like the 
lower courts, the agencies have chosen to interpret Rapanos itself rather than 
issue new regulations to clarify the meaning of “waters of the United States.” 
This Part explores the lower courts’ reactions to Rapanos, then discusses 
the EPA’s and the Army Corps’ joint attempt to reconcile the Justices’ 
opinions through agency guidance. It ends by suggesting that Brand X offers 
the agencies, the courts, and the many entities potentially subject to CWA 
regulation a clearer and more uniform response to the Supreme Court’s 
plurality decision. 
 
 316 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 317 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. EPA, REPORT NO. 09-N-0149, CONGRESSIONALLY REQUESTED 
REPORT ON COMMENTS RELATED TO EFFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL UNCERTAINTY ON CLEAN WATER ACT 
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter EPA REPORT], available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/ 
20090430-09-N-0149.pdf (emphasizing that jurisdictional determinations are a “major resource drain,” that 
“Rapanos has created a lot of uncertainty with regards to EPA’s compliance and enforcement activities,” and 
that CWA enforcement has decreased since the decision). 
 318 See Lawrence R. Liebesman et al., Rapanos v. United States: Searching for a Significant Nexus Using 
Proximate Causation and Foreseeability Principles, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,242, 11,253 
(2010) (noting that the average applicant for an individual Section 404 permit “spends 788 days and $271,596 
in completing the process”). 
 319 EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 2. 
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A. Federal Courts’ Reactions to the Rapanos Decision 
In Rapanos itself, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the Marks rule 
would guide lower courts in applying the plurality decision,320 and several 
lower courts have followed that suggestion. For example, in two of the earliest 
court of appeals cases applying Rapanos, both the Ninth Circuit and the 
Seventh Circuit applied Marks to conclude that Justice Kennedy’s significant-
nexus test provided the narrowest grounds of the decision. The Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis was rather short, citing Marks and concluding that “Justice Kennedy, 
constituting the fifth vote for reversal, concurred only in the judgment and, 
therefore, provides the controlling rule of law.”321 The Seventh Circuit 
provided a bit more reasoning, concluding that Justice Kennedy’s “test is 
narrower (so far as reining in federal authority is concerned) than the 
plurality’s in most cases.”322 Thus, somewhat ironically, these two courts used 
Marks to conclude that a test that garnered only one Justice’s vote would be 
the exclusive interpretation of CWA “navigable waters.”323 The Eleventh 
Circuit later agreed.324 
Other lower courts, however, found the Marks rule unhelpful. For example, 
in an early unpublished opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida attempted to apply the Marks rule to Rapanos, but it concluded that 
there was no way to assess whether the plurality’s test or Justice Kennedy’s 
test constituted the narrowest grounds for the decision.325 As a result, the 
district court adopted Justice Stevens’s suggestion and concluded that CWA 
jurisdiction would exist when a water qualified as a water of the United States 
under either of the two interpretations.326 The First Circuit soon followed suit, 
 
 320 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Berkolow, 
supra note 17, at 319 (noting the Chief Justice’s suggestion that the lower courts apply Marks). 
 321 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), withdrawn, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007). But see United States v. 
Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (using all three opinions in Rapanos to conclude that “the 
Supreme Court unanimously agreed that intermittent streams (at least those that are seasonal) can be waters of 
the United States”). 
 322 United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing 
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
 323 Joseph Cacace has argued cogently that how the Marks rule applies to Rapanos depends on the 
approach to Marks that a court takes. Specifically, under either the narrowest-grounds approach or the social-
choice view, Justice Kennedy’s opinion emerges as controlling. Cacace, supra note 25, at 122–23, 125. In 
contrast, “The Marks doctrine is essentially inapplicable to Rapanos under the conventional view.” Id. at 124. 
 324 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1219–22 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 325 United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 
2006) (discussing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
 326 Id. 
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noting that Marks “has proven troublesome in application for the Supreme 
Court itself and for the lower courts.”327 In particular, applying any narrowest-
grounds analysis to Rapanos was unhelpful because “[t]he cases in which 
Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction [we]re not a subset of the 
cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction.”328 As a result, the First 
Circuit adopted Justice Stevens’s approach, noting that, in effect, at least five 
Justices had voted for both interpretations.329 The Fifth Circuit,330 Sixth 
Circuit,331 and Eighth Circuit332 have similarly followed or explicitly adopted 
this “either interpretation” approach.333 
A very few lower courts essentially elected to ignore Rapanos entirely and 
revert to pre-Rapanos circuit precedent on “waters of the United States.” For 
example, soon after Rapanos (and before the Fifth Circuit applied all three 
major opinions), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
announced that “the Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus of a majority as 
to the jurisdictional boundary of the CWA” and that Justice Kennedy 
“advanced an ambiguous test—whether a ‘significant nexus’ exists to waters 
that are/were/might be navigable. This test leaves no guidance on how to 
implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is 
‘significant’ and how is a ‘nexus’ determined?”334 As a result, “Because 
Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this 
Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”335 
Thus, there is currently a split in the lower federal courts regarding how to 
assess CWA “navigable waters.” Given the acknowledged differences between 
the plurality’s approach and Justice Kennedy’s, as a result of the Rapanos 
plurality, the CWA is being applied differently in different parts of the 
 
 327 United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2006) (referring to Marks, 430 U.S. at 193). 
 328 Id. at 64. 
 329 Id. at 64–66. 
 330 United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 325–27 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 331 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 206–10 (6th Cir. 2009) (explicitly ducking what the court 
called the “Marks-meets-Rapanos” problem because the water at issue met both the plurality’s and Justice 
Kennedy’s tests). 
 332 United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 333 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 334–35 (noting that “the majority of courts” that have considered the 
issue have followed the either-interpretation approach); id. at 335–38 (noting that the lower courts have taken 
one of three approaches in applying Marks to the Rapanos opinions, including the either-interpretation 
approach). 
 334 United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 335 Id. 
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country,336 undermining a basic rule-of-law premise that federal law should 
apply relatively uniformly across the United States.337 Moreover, lower court 
judges’ frustration with the post-Rapanos quagmire is at times palpable.338 
Congress, of course, could have resolved the meanings of “navigable 
waters” and “waters of the United States” through statutory amendment, but 
despite numerous efforts,339 it has not (yet) done so. Perhaps more remarkably, 
in over five years of uncertainty, the EPA and the Army Corps have done little 
to resolve the confusion that Rapanos left. This inaction continues despite the 
importance of the issue to CWA regulation and the relatively clear declarations 
by five Rapanos Justices that agency action was possible—even imperative. 
B. The 2007 Rapanos Guidance 
While the EPA and the Army Corps have not issued new regulations 
defining “waters of the United States,” they did, in 2007 (almost a year after 
the decision, with an amendment in 2008), issue joint guidance in response to 
Rapanos.340 However, the guidance does not reinterpret the CWA; instead, it 
attempts to interpret and apply the Rapanos plurality opinions.341 Moreover, 
like those federal courts that eschewed the Marks rule in favor of the Justice 
Stevens either-interpretation approach, the guidance refuses to choose between 
 
 336 See EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 3 (emphasizing the circuit split and the legal uncertainty that 
surrounds CWA jurisdictional determinations, despite the agencies’ guidance). 
 337 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 7; Buzbee, supra note 13, at 602. 
 338 See United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (detailing, on remand, Senior 
District Judge Robert B. Propst’s frustrations with Rapanos and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to define 
Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus test as controlling under Marks, and “direct[ing] the Clerk to reassign this 
case to another judge for trial,” at least in part because the judge was “so perplexed by the way the law 
applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate for me to try it again”). 
 339 Jeff B. Kray, Five Years After Rapanos—EPA Prepares New Clean Water Act Jurisdictional 
Guidance, MARTEN LAW (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110203-epa-prepares-new-
cwa-guidance (noting that bills have been introduced in Congress to fix the jurisdictional problem in 2003, 
2005, 2007, and 2009). The most recent attempts to define the CWA’s term “waters of the United States” by 
statutory amendment are the Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111th Cong. (2009), and America’s 
Commitment to Clean Water Act, H.R. 5088, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 340 U.S. EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
RAPANOS GUIDANCE], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CWA_Jurisdiction_Following_ 
Rapanos120208.pdf. This Article refers to this material as the “Rapanos Guidance.” 
 341 See Berkolow, supra note 17, at 334 (“Significantly, the regulators agree with the majority of courts 
considering the issue thus far: the recently released guidance documents essentially provide that the regulators 
may assert jurisdiction under the CWA if either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied.”); id. at 
346 (“Consequently, the agencies’ approach to guidance for the regulated is a hybrid of the plurality’s and 
Justice Kennedy’s tests.”). 
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the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s interpretations of “waters of the United 
States.” 
Specifically, the agencies declared that they would continue to assert 
jurisdiction over four categories of waters: “[t]raditional navigable waters” (the 
classic source of federal water jurisdiction); “[w]etlands adjacent to traditional 
navigable waters” (the Riverside Bayview category); “[n]on-navigable 
tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent where 
the tributaries typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at least 
seasonally” (i.e., tributaries that meet the plurality’s test from Rapanos); and 
“[w]etlands that directly abut such tributaries” (i.e., wetlands that meet the 
plurality’s test from Rapanos).342 
For all other waters, the agencies use Justice Kennedy’s significant-nexus 
test.343 More specifically, the agencies use Justice Kennedy’s interpretation to 
assess the jurisdictional status of “[n]on-navigable tributaries that are not 
relatively permanent,” “[w]etlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that 
are not relatively permanent,” and “[w]etlands adjacent to but that do not 
directly abut a relatively permanent non-navigable tributary.”344 According to 
the guidance, the agencies determine whether a significant nexus exists by 
“assess[ing] the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the 
functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if 
they significantly affect the chemical, physical and biological integrity of 
downstream traditional navigable waters.”345 Thus, pursuant to the significant-
nexus test, the agencies examine both hydrologic (physical) and ecologic 
factors.346 Hydrologic factors include “volume, duration, and frequency of 
flow, including consideration of certain physical characteristics of the 
tributary”; “proximity to the traditional navigable water”; “size of the 
watershed”; “average annual rainfall”; and “average annual winter snow 
pack.”347 Ecologic factors include “potential of tributaries to carry pollutants 
and flood waters to traditional navigable waters,” “provision of aquatic habitat 
that supports a traditional navigable water,” “potential of wetlands to trap and 
filter pollutants or store flood waters,” and “maintenance of water quality in 
 
 342 RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 340, at 1. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 8. 
CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:56 PM 
2011] AGENCIES INTERPRETING COURTS INTERPRETING STATUTES 63 
traditional navigable waters.”348 The agencies also emphasize in their Rapanos 
Guidance that the significant-nexus test requires documentation of the 
evidence of the connections that tributaries and wetlands have to traditional 
navigable waters.349 
For now, therefore, the Army Corps and EPA have declined to exercise the 
interpretive authority that the CWA delegated to them in responding to 
Rapanos. Moreover, the agencies appear to believe that this is their only 
option. In May 2011, they released a proposed second round of post-Rapanos 
guidance,350 which again operates to reconcile the various Rapanos 
opinions.351 The proposed new guidance does better in explaining some aspects 
of how the agencies will apply Rapanos, providing: 
• Clarification that small streams and streams that flow part of the 
year are protected under the Clean Water Act if they have a 
physical, chemical or biological connection to larger bodies of water 
downstream and could affect the integrity of those downstream 
waters. Agencies would be able to evaluate groups of waters 
holistically rather than the current, piecemeal, stream-by-stream 
analysis. 
• Acknowledgment that when a water body does not have a surface 
connection to an interstate water or a traditional navigable water, 
but there is a significant physical, chemical or biological connection 
between the two, both waterbodies should be protected under the 
Clean Water Act. 
• Recognition that waterbodies may be “traditional navigable waters,” 
and subject to Clean Water Act protections, under a wider range of 
circumstances than identified in previous guidance. 
• Clarification that interstate waters (crossing state borders) are 
protected.352 
Nevertheless, the agencies still very much consider themselves bound to 
reconciling the Rapanos plurality opinions. For example, they have declared 
 
 348 Id. 
 349 Id. at 11. 
 350 EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the 
Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011); see also U.S. EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_4-
2011.pdf. 
 351 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 350, at 1–3. 
 352 Guidance to Identify Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://water.epa.gov/ 
lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters_guidesum.cfm (last updated Apr. 27, 2011). 
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that “[t]he proposed guidance is consistent with the principles established by 
the Supreme Court cases and is supported by the agencies’ scientific 
understanding of how waterbodies and watersheds function.”353 The comment 
period for the proposed guidance remained open into July 2011, with final 
issuance expected thereafter.354 
C. The Rapanos Guidance in the Federal Courts 
In issuing the 2007 Rapanos Guidance, the EPA and the Army Corps 
elected to act as agencies interpreting the Supreme Court, rather than agencies 
interpreting the CWA. Under this Article’s argument, therefore, the agencies 
have thus far foregone any claims to Chevron deference for their interpretation 
of “waters of the United States.”355 
Nevertheless, the Rapanos Guidance has received little discussion from the 
lower federal courts. What opinions do exist emphasize its tentative356 and 
nonbinding nature,357 underscoring the fact that Chevron deference is 
inappropriate regardless of Brand X. 
So far, only one federal court, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, has wrestled with the issue of deference to the Army 
Corps’ determinations of CWA jurisdiction under the Rapanos Guidance, and 
its opinion demonstrates the tangled deference issues that courts now face in 
the context of CWA jurisdictional determinations. In Precon Development 
Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Eastern District of 
Virginia faced a challenge to the Army Corps’ determination that CWA 
jurisdiction existed over a particular body of water after the Army Corps used 
 
 353 EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the 
Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,479. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Of course, the form of the guidance would also cause problems with Chevron deference because the 
agencies did not issue it through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The point here, however, is that the 
agencies have chosen to try to interpret the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Rapanos rather than assert 
their own authority to interpret the CWA itself. 
 356 P & V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 516 F.3d 1021, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that, in 
light of the Rapanos Guidance, “[a]ny evaluation of the Corps’ CWA jurisdiction thus appears far from 
complete”). 
 357 See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Precon I), 658 F. Supp. 2d 752, 764 (E.D. Va. 
2009) (noting that the Army Corps is not bound by the guidance in making jurisdictional determinations); 
United States v. Moses, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226 (D. Idaho 2009) (emphasizing, in response to a claim that 
the Army Corps had deviated from the guidance, that “the guidance memorandum is just that—a guidance 
memorandum”). 
CRAIG GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 12:56 PM 
2011] AGENCIES INTERPRETING COURTS INTERPRETING STATUTES 65 
the Rapanos Guidance to determine that jurisdiction existed.358 The court spent 
two pages of the opinion discussing the appropriate deference and the potential 
applicability of the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the APA’s 
substantial-evidence standard, and the Chevron framework.359 It concluded that 
Chevron provided the correct framework for evaluating the deference owed to 
the agencies but that, after SWANCC and Rapanos, the Army Corps was not 
entitled to Chevron deference based on its unamended “waters of the United 
States” regulations.360 Moreover, because the Rapanos Guidance was not 
issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and because the Army Corps 
did not make its jurisdictional determination through formal adjudication, 
neither the guidance nor the jurisdictional determination was entitled to 
Chevron deference.361 Indeed, the United States conceded that the guidance 
was not entitled to Chevron deference.362 As a result, the Army Corps’ 
determination through the guidance would be judged pursuant to Skidmore 
deference.363 In its January 2011 decision on appeal, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed that Skidmore deference was appropriate.364 
Although the district court did uphold the jurisdictional determination 
under Skidmore,365 its struggles with the deference issue signal that Rapanos’s 
legacy of legal uncertainty is not limited to the question of what interpretation 
to use to determine whether a body of water qualifies as a CWA navigable 
water. In addition, the EPA’s and Army Corps’ partially invalidated and 
partially upheld notice-and-comment regulations currently coexist with the 
Rapanos plurality opinions, the lower court splits, and the informally issued 
Rapanos Guidance, creating a jumble of deference issues and adding to the 
confusion for lower courts already coping with the Rapanos plurality decision. 
 
 358 Precon I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 756. 
 359 Id. at 759–61. 
 360 Id. at 761–62. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Id. at 763. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Precon II), 633 F.3d 278, 290 n.10 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(confirming that the Army Corps could not receive Chevron deference); id. at 291 (confirming that the Army 
Corps was entitled to Skidmore deference). 
 365 Precon I, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the Army Corps’ 
administrative record regarding the presence of a significant nexus under the Rapanos Guidance to be 
insufficient. Precon II, 633 F.3d at 297. 
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D. Resolving the Conundrum: A Better Response to Rapanos 
As of mid-2011, therefore, none of the normative goals of a federal 
regulatory scheme (or the rule of law more generally) are actually being met. 
The CWA’s term “waters of the United States” is subject to different legal tests 
in different circuits, destroying the goal of national uniformity. Regulated 
entities are subject to differing and unclear rules for when the CWA applies. 
This reality undermines norms of evenhanded regulation, consistency of the 
law, and comprehensible notice of legal obligations. Resolution of 
jurisdictional issues, especially pursuant to the case-by-case significant-nexus 
analysis,366 is complex, time-consuming, and expensive for both the regulating 
agencies and the regulated entities, defeating goals of regulatory efficiency. 
In the continued absence of congressional action, Brand X offers the EPA 
and the Army Corps a way to resolve the post-Rapanos definitional confusion 
regarding the CWA’s “navigable waters.” Brand X also offers a way to restore 
the national uniformity that is supposed to be the hallmark of federal law. As 
was discussed in Part III, the two agencies are not locked in a trap of 
interpreting the Rapanos Court; instead, as agencies, they can issue new 
notice-and-comment regulations and demand Chevron deference for their 
interpretations. 
Of course, as lower courts have pointed out in other Brand X contexts,367 
the two CWA agencies could not legitimately repromulgate their existing 
regulations because the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview, 
SWANCC, and even Rapanos provide relevant legal data points regarding the 
scope of a reasonable interpretation of “waters of the United States.” For 
example, under all three decisions, navigable-in-fact waters are clearly subject 
to the CWA. Under Riverside Bayview, wetlands adjacent to these larger 
waters, and probably the immediate tributaries of those waters, are waters of 
the United States. In contrast, under SWANCC’s semi-constitutional analysis, 
“waters of the United States” cannot include small and isolated waters with no 
hydrologic connection to other waters. SWANCC and Rapanos also both 
underscore a concern with federalism issues and the Commerce Clause 
 
 366 See EPA REPORT, supra note 317, at 1–3 (detailing the agency’s difficulties after Rapanos); Kenneth 
S. Gould, Drowning in Wetlands Jurisdictional Determination Process: Implementation of Rapanos v. United 
States, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 413, 440–49 (2008) (detailing at length how difficult obtaining a 
permit has become under the significant-nexus test); Liebesman et al., supra note 318, at 11,253 (“The 
significant nexus concept is fraught with unknowns.”). 
 367 See supra Part I.C.2. 
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limitations of federal regulatory authority, and all three cases indicate that the 
agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” should relate to the 
CWA’s core purpose—“to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”368 
Nevertheless, while these legal data points identify interpretive constraints 
(especially constraints touching on the U.S. Constitution), they do not 
eliminate all (or even much) agency flexibility in defining “waters of the 
United States.” In particular, the agencies should be free to reject both the 
plurality’s test and Justice Kennedy’s case-by-case significant-nexus 
approach—which both the agencies and commentators view as pragmatically 
unmanageable369—in favor of a definition of “waters of the United States” that 
is both broader than the plurality’s interpretation and easier to apply than 
Justice Kennedy’s interpretation. For example, the agencies could use their 
expertise to establish definitive categories of waters of the United States, with 
perhaps brighter-line tests based on size, flow, proximity to navigable waters, 
expected effects on downstream navigable waters and on commerce, and so 
forth. Such categories would both provide clearer criteria for regulated entities 
to apply than the significant-nexus analysis and improve regulatory efficiency 
on all sides. 
If the courts are faithful to Brand X, these new and clearer regulations 
should become the nationally controlling law pursuant to Chevron. Such 
uniform, nationally applicable regulations would dramatically improve the 
post-Rapanos disarray by (1) improving the agencies’ own enforcement 
efficiency and evenhandedness; (2) reestablishing the equality of potentially 
regulated entities throughout the nation with respect to the CWA’s 
applicability; (3) clarifying when regulated entities are subject to the CWA’s 
permitting requirements; and (4) clarifying and simplifying judicial review of 
challenged assertions of CWA jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
At the formation of the United States, Alexander Hamilton argued that the 
definitive motive for establishing a single national Supreme Court was the 
“necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws.”370 When the 
 
 368 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 369 See supra note 366. 
 370 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 244 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009). 
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Supreme Court abdicates its responsibility to provide this national uniformity 
and clarity, as it does in plurality decisions, the legal issue at stake may in 
many cases simply have to re-percolate through the lower federal courts before 
the confusion and lower court splits are finally resolved. 
However, when the Supreme Court issues plurality decisions regarding 
agency-administered statutes or administrative interpretations, Congress has 
provided another entity that can reestablish the expected norms of uniformity 
and clarity in the application of federal law. Indeed, an argument can be made 
that federal agencies, even more than the Supreme Court, have positive and 
normative duties to resolve the dissensus that a plurality decision embodies. As 
Elizabeth Foote aptly recognized, the core function of a federal agency is 
public administration of a federal program,371 at a national level: 
Unlike courts, . . . agencies do not exist to issue disinterested and 
authoritative interpretations of statutes based on strictly legal 
processes. As organizations of public administration, agencies are 
charged with carrying out statutory provisions—that is, with 
implementing public policies through operational programs. 
Administrative rules represent interstitial, provisional, operational 
applications that can be, and often are, altered as agency expertise 
evolves and political currents shift. Accordingly, agencies by law use 
institutional processes that involve controls by the political branches. 
They have mechanisms for public input and accountability that 
advance bureaucratic and management objectives and rely on 
technical expertise. While statutory factors are part of the 
administrative process, the business of public bureaucracies is not the 
same as the business of the courts to interpret statutes in cases or 
controversies.372 
In Brand X, the Supreme Court established that federal agencies can 
displace federal court interpretations of the statutes that federal agencies 
implement. Whatever arguments exist for sequestering Supreme Court 
majority decisions from the operation of Brand X, they cannot operate to 
immobilize federal agencies coping with Supreme Court plurality decisions. 
Instead, Brand X frees a federal agency to continue to exercise its own 
interpretive authority, promoting national uniformity and the rule of law in a 
post-plurality regulatory world. 
 
 
 371 Foote, supra note 160, at 697. 
 372 Id. at 675. 
